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Abstract 
This thesis studies the impact of macroeconomic announcements on the U.S. Treasury 
market and investigates profitable opportunities around macroeconomic announcements 
using data from the eSpeed electronic trading platform. We investigate how 
macroeconomic announcements affect the return predictability of trade imbalance for the 
2-year, 5-year, IO-year U.S. Treasury notes and 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds. The goal of 
this thesis is to develop a methodology to identify informed trades and estimate the trade 
imbalance based on informed trades. We use the daily order book slope as a proxy for 
dispersion of beliefs among investors. Regression results in this thesis indicate that, on 
announcement days with a high dispersion of beliefs, daily trade imbalance estimated by 
informed trades significantly predicts returns on the following day. In addition, we 
develop a trade-imbalance based trading strategy conditional on dispersion of beliefs, 
informed trades, and announcement days. The trading strategy yields significantly 
positive net returns for the 2-year T-notes. 
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1. Introduction 
The objective of this thesis is to study how macroeconomic information arrival, informed 
trading and dispersion of beliefs among investors affect the informational role of trade 
imbalance in predicting the U.S. Treasury returns. Many studies have been developed to 
explore the relation between financial returns and trade imbalance. Hasbrouck (1996) 
shows that total trade imbalance explains 7.5% of the variance in thirty minute returns in 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Chordia et al. (2008) find significant results that 
trade imbalance predicts five-minute returns, but the predictability is diminished during 
the liquid periods. Moshirian et al (2009) find that both trade imbalance and order book 
slope imbalance predict thirty-minute returns in Australian Securities Exchange and the 
predictability is strengthened when there are public information arrivals. 
While many studies focus on the return predictability of trade imbalance at intraday level, 
we investigate return predictability of trade imbalance at a daily level. Within a short-
time interval, when liquidity and informed traders buy (sell), prices will move up (down). 
Therefore, trades by liquidity traders can also contribute to a positive return predictability 
of trade imbalance within a short-time interval. We examine return predictability of trade 
imbalance at daily level to reduce the liquidity effects on prices. 
The previous studies that examine the return predictability of trade imbalance estimate 
the trade imbalance based on aggregate trades without differentiating informed trades 
from liquidity trades. This thesis contributes to the literature on trade imbalance 
estimation by differentiating informed trades from liquidity trades and estimating trade 
imbalance based on informed trades only. If we simply estimate trade imbalance based on 
aggregate trades, trade imbalance may not be a good indicator of the position that 
informed traders take. Trade imbalance should be more informative when we consider 
informed trades only. This thesis uses aggressive trades as a proxy for informed trades. 
Motivated by Abad and Rubia (2004) and Harris and Hasbrouck (1996), which show that 
aggressive orders are likely to be submitted by informed traders, this thesis develops a 
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methodology to differentiate informed trades from liquidity trades based on order 
aggressiveness. We believe that informed traders with short-lived information are more 
likely to act impatiently and place aggressive orders. 
However, whether informed traders are more likely to use aggressive orders is a 
controversial issue in the existing literature. On one hand, there are studies (Easley and 
O'Hara, 1992; Beber and Caglio, 2005; Lo and Sapp, 2007) documenting that informed 
traders tend to trade less aggressively to hide their private information. On the other hand, 
some studies (Abad & Rubia, 2004; Lo & Coggins, 2006; Ma et aI., 2007) argue that with 
short-lived information, informed traders would like to place aggressive orders. This 
thesis examines the relationship between aggressive orders and informed trades by 
looking into the return predictability of trade imbalance based on aggressive trades. First 
of all, we estimate trade imbalance by using aggressive trades. If informed traders are 
more likely to place aggressive orders, trade imbalance estimated by aggressive orders 
should be more informative on future returns. We believe that return predictability of 
trade imbalance is a better measure for the relationship between aggressive orders and 
informed trading, since this measure directly investigates information content of the 
aggressive trades. 
In addition, this thesis examines how the dispersion of beliefs affects the return 
predictability of trade imbalance on macroeconomic announcement days. The U.S. 
Treasury market is mainly driven by the release of macroeconomic indicators and 
Treasury prices largely react to the arrival of public information aboutthe economy. It is 
of great interest to investigate how macroeconomic announcements affect the return 
predictability of trade imbalance, since public news can raise the degree of dispersion of 
beliefs among investors and trigger informed trading. Moshirian et aI. (2009) suggest that 
if an announcement is not easy to interpret by all the investors, skilled traders can extract 
private information from the announcement. We believe that skilled traders may take 
advantage of the announcements that are hard to interpret and speculate in the Treasury 
market. In tum, the trade imbalance on the announcement days with a high dispersion of 
beliefs among investors should be more informative on future returns. 
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Moreover, this thesis can be viewed as a study of market efficiency when public 
information is hard to interpret. In semi-strong efficient markets, prices should reflect 
public information instantly and investors should not be able to predict returns using 
public information (Fama, 1970). However, during macroeconomic announcement days 
with high dispersion of beliefs among investors, it may take longer for prices to adjust to 
public information. On these days, skilled traders may be able to predict futures prices 
and generate positive dollar returns. We examine the efficiency of the treasury markets 
by investigating return predictability. 
To measure the dispersion of beliefs, we use the order book slope, which was developed 
by Naes and Skjeltorp (2006). The order book slope is calculated by the average elasticity 
of the supply and demand schedules in the order book, which captures dispersion of 
beliefs among investors. Although there are many studies (Diether et aI., 2002; Kallberg 
& Pasquariello, 2008; Green, 2004; Pasquariello & Vega, 2007) measuring dispersion of 
beliefs by the standard deviation across professional forecasts for the macroeconomic 
indicator in the Treasury market, we believe that the order book slope is a better measure. 
While the standard deviation across professional forecasts captures the divergence of 
opinions among investors on the value of a macroeconomic indicator, the order book 
slope measures the dispersion of beliefs among investors directly on the asset value itself. 
Therefore, we believe that the order book slope reflects investors' expectations better. 
However, the GovPX Treasury data that current studies use contains quote and size 
information only for the first tier1, so they cannot calculate the order book slope as a 
proxy for dispersion of beliefs. This thesis conducts the study based on the newly 
available U.S. Treasury data from the electronic platform, eSpeed, which contains all the 
trading information for six tiers and enables us to calculate the order book slope in the 
Treasury market. 
1 The first tier shows the trading information for the best bids and asks. The best bid (ask) denotes the 
highest (lowest) bid (ask) price. 
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The empirical results of this thesis show that, on the macroeconomic announcement days 
with high dispersion of beliefs, daily trade imbalance estimated by aggressive trades 
strongly pr~dicts returns on the following day for the 2-year, 5-year and IO-year Treasury 
notes. Chordia et al. (2002), and Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) find a positive and 
significant relation between lagged daily imbalance and returns in stock markets, but the 
relation becomes negative after controlling for current imbalance, since the effect of 
current imbalance overweighs the impact of current trades that are auto-correlated with 
past trades. Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) also propose that a large trade imbalance 
before an informational event could denote informed trading, but the informational 
impact of trade imbalance on returns is left for future research. 
This thesis adds to the literature by investigating the informational effect of trade 
imbalance on treasury returns. This thesis provides empirical evidence that even after 
controlling for the current trade imbalance, on the macroeconomic announcement days 
with high dispersion of beliefs, the relationship between the daily trade imbalance 
estimated by aggressive (informed) trades and returns on the following day is still 
significant and positive. This result provides supporting evidence that the return 
predictability of the trade imbalance is attributed to the information content of the trade 
imbalance by informed trades, rather than the auto-correlation between the current and 
past trades. Moreover, this result provides supporting evidence that skilled (informed) 
traders trade aggressively to take advantage of their information and that skilled traders 
are likely to speculate on macroeconomic announcement days with high dispersion of 
beliefs. 
Furthermore, based on the regression results, we develop a trade-imbalance based trading 
strategy conditional on dispersion of beliefs and announcement days. The trading strategy 
yields positive returns for 2-year, 5-year and IO-year Treasury notes but the positive 
returns are only significant for the 2-year notes when the daily order book slope is 25% 
and 30% lower than the average slope of the previous 365 days.2 
2 Low slope implies high dispersion of beliefs. Please see methodology section for details. 
4 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Section 2, a brief literature review is 
provided. Section 3 presents a description of eSpeed U.S. Treasury data and the 
macroeconomic announcement data. Section 4 describes the methodology and model 
development. In Section 5, descriptive statistics and empirical results are provided. 
Section 6 develops a trading strategy based on the regression results. Section 7 presents a 
summary for this thesis. 
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2. Literature Review 
This thesis investigates the return predictability of trade imbalance and how 
macroeconomic announcements, informed trading and dispersion of beliefs among 
investors affect the return predictability. Therefore, the following literature review 
focuses on previous studies in the fields of return predictability of trade imbalance, 
-
impact of macroeconomic announcements, informed trading and order aggressiveness as 
well as dispersion of beliefs. 
2.1 Return Predictability of Trade Imbalance 
The main contribution of this thesis is to study the return predictability of trade imbalance 
in the U.S. Treasury market and how the predictability changes around macroeconomic 
releases and periods with high dispersion of beliefs. Trade imbalance is calculated as the 
number of buyer initiated trades minus seller initiated trades. To some degree, trade 
imbalance reflects investors' views of the market and their expectation for future prices. 
A positive (negative) trade imbalance signals the investors' expectations in price increase 
(decrease) in the future. Trade imbalance can signal private information and in tum 
reduce liquidity temporarily, and affect the market price (Kyle, 1985). 
Existing literature documents that trade imbalance contains significant information and is 
closely related to future prices in various financial markets. Hasbrouck (1996) shows that 
total trade imbalance explains 7.5% of the variance in thirty- minute returns in the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Chordia et al. (2002) study trading activity in the New 
York Stock Exchange. They provide supporting evidence that one-sided trade imbalance, 
excess buying or selling, reduces market liquidity, and market returns are strongly 
affected by current and lagged trade imbalance. They show that daily lagged trade 
imbalance significantly and positively predicts future returns, but the relation becomes 
negative after controlling for contemporaneous trade imbalance. Breedon and Vitale 
(2004) suggest that trade imbalance conveys information, which directly impacts the 
exchange rates in the foreign exchange market. Similar to Chordia et al. (2002), Chordia 
and Subrahmanyam (2004) find a positive relation between lagged daily trade imbalance 
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and returns in the stock market, but the positive relationship become negative after 
controlling for the current imbalance. In addition, they develop a trading strategy based 
on trade imbalance, which yields statistically significant returns. Lo and Coggins (2006) 
show that the degree of return reversal is positively related to the level of trade imbalance 
in the Australian equity market. Brandt et al. (2007) suggest that the current impact of the 
trade imbalance on the future and cash market is significant and permanent, but the 
impact of the lagged trade imbalance is not significant. Moreover, they find that futures 
and spot market trade imbalances are good predictors of daily returns in each market and 
that the type of trader3 influences the effect of trade imbalance. Chordia et al. (2008) 
investigate all NYSE firms in a sample period and run a regression of five-minute returns 
on past five-minute trade imbalance. They find significant results that trade imbalance 
can predict five-minute returns, but the predictability is diminished during the liquid 
periods. Moshirian et al. (2009) regress thirty- minute returns on one lagged trade 
imbalance and order book slope imbalance in the Australian Securities Exchange without 
controlling for the current trade imbalance. They show that both trade imbalance and 
order book slope imbalance predict future returns and that the predictability is 
strengthened when there are public information arrivals. 
Unlike the equity market, the U.S. Treasury market is mainly driven by public news. 
However, public information can also trigger private opinions, since market participants 
have different abilities to interpret public information (Kim & Verrecchia, 1994; Green, 
2004). Thus, to some extent, trade imbalance in the Treasury market can reveal private 
information and predict future returns. Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) find a negative 
correlation between current net trade imbalance and yields (excess demand pushes prices 
up and therefore lower yields) in the Treasury market. The effect of trade imbalance 
increases when liquidity is lower. Green (2004) finds that trade imbalance contains little 
information before the release of economic news and more information after the release. 
The increased information content of trading following the announcements demonstrates 
3 Brandt et al (2007) define traders in 4 categories: 1. Individual CBOT members. 2. CBOT clearing 
member firms trading for their house accounts. 3. CBOT members filling orders for other CBOT members. 
4. Public customers. The results suggest the order flow is more informative when the order falls into 
category 2,3, and 4. 
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that the releases of the macroeconomic indicators raise the level of information 
asymmetry in the Treasury market. Pasquariello and Vega (2007) provide evidence that 
adverse selection costs of unanticipated trade imbalance in the U.S. Treasury market are 
higher when the dispersion of beliefs is higher. Ozocak and Han (2009) find that trade 
imbalance in London trading hours is significantly and positively related to the bond 
price changes in the U.S. trading hours on macroeconomic announcement days. 
While the previous studies examine the information content of aggregate trade imbalance, 
this thesis develops a proxy to differentiate informed trades from liquidity trades and 
estimates daily trade imbalance based on aggressive (informed) trades only. The trades 
by liquidity traders may create a noise in the return predictability of the trade imbalance, 
since the liquidity traders possess no private information. The trade imbalance estimated 
by informed trades is a better indicator of the position that informed traders take, which 
should be more informative for future price. Moreover, we add to the current literature by 
investigating the return predictability of daily trade imbalance on the announcement days 
with high dispersion of beliefs in the U.S. Treasury market. The dispersion of beliefs is 
measured by the daily order book slope. Pasquariello and Vega (2007) find that 
unanticipated trade imbalance is negatively and significantly correlated with bond yield 
changes when dispersion of beliefs among informed traders is higher and when public 
announcement is noisy. Therefore, we expect that trade imbalance is more valuable to 
convey private information on the announcement days with high dispersion of beliefs in 
the U.S. Treasury market. Current literature (Chordia et aI., 2002; Chordia & 
Subrahmanyam, 2004) show that daily lagged trade imbalance and current returns are 
positively related when current trade imbalance is not included in the regressions, but the 
relation between past trade imbalance and current returns is significantly negative after 
controlling for current trade imbalance because of inventory effects. Different from the 
previous literature, we investigate the relationship between trade imbalance (estimated by 
informed trades) and returns on announcement days with high dispersion of beliefs. 
2.2 Impact of Macroeconomic Announcements 
The U.S. Treasury market is mainly driven by the release of macroeconomic indicators. 
Macroeconomic indicators can show the overall economic development and indicate a 
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growth or a decline in economy, may lead to a great influence on the Treasury market In 
contrast to stock prices, the U.S. Treasury prices largely react to the arrival of public 
information on the economy, since bond prices depend only on expected discount rates 
while stock prices are also determined by future expected dividends.4 The cash flow of 
Treasury securities is known and their prices are mainly affected by macroeconomic 
news releases (He et aI., 2009). Thus, it is of great importance to study the information 
effect of macroeconomic announcements on the Treasury market. We focus on the 
scheduled U.S. macroeconomic announcements, which are released at precisely 
identifiable times. The high frequency Treasury data obtained from the electronic 
platform eSpeed enables us to examine market liquidity, the dispersion of beliefs, as well 
as the return predictability of trade imbalance in response to macroeconomic 
announcements. This thesis investigates how public news arrivals affect the 
informativeness of trade imbalance on Treasury returns, especially during the days with 
high dispersion of beliefs among investors. 
Nikkinen and Sahlstrom (2001) find that market uncertainty decreases after U.S. 
macroeconomic announcements on the stock market. Thus, according to Nikkinen and 
Sahlstrom (2001), we should expect that the release of public news reduces information 
asymmetry and dilutes the information advantages of the informed traders. However, 
Moshirian et al (2009) argue that if informed traders have superior skills to extract private 
information, private information may be created by public information arrivals which are 
hard to interpret. In tum, the public information arrivals offer information advantages to 
the informed traders. Moshirian et aI., (2009) also provide empirical evidence that public 
news releases increase the return predictability of trade imbalance at the 5-minute level in 
the Australian Securities market. 
Differently from Moshirian et aI., (2009), this thesis examines the daily return 
predictability of trade imbalance on announcement days when the announcements are 
4 Fleming and Remolona (1999) indicate that bond prices react more strongly to macro announcements than 
do equity market. They examined the 25 largest price changes in the GovPX data and related them all to 
macroeconomic announcements and significant announcement effects were found. However, Macro 
announcements can have little or no effect on stock prices if their effects on expected dividends and 
discount rate offset each other. 
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hard to interpret. If macroeconomic announcements are hard to interpret, only skilled 
traders can extract private information from the announcements. Thus, on the 
announcement days with high a dispersion of beliefs among investors, trade imbalance 
estimated by the informed trades may be more informative for future returns. If the 
announcements are not easy to understand, it may take a longer time for the price to 
adjust to the public information. We expect that, on the announcement days with a high 
dispersion of beliefs, the trade imbalance estimated by the informed trades can 
significantly and positively predict future returns. 
In addition, a large body of literature has examined the effect of macroeconomic 
announcements on the Treasury market liquidity. Fleming (1997) was the first to conduct 
a comprehensive intraday study of the round-the- clock market for the U.S. Treasury. The 
study finds that trading volume is lower during Tokyo trading hours and remains steady 
throughout London hours, but significantly increases between 8:30 am and 9 am in New 
York trading hours, which can be explained by the macroeconomic announcements 
releases at 8:30 am. Balduzzi et al. (2001) show that price volatility and trading volume 
increase significantly after macroeconomic announcements. Green (2004) examines the 
impact of trading on Treasury bond prices around the release of macroeconomic news. A 
large increase in the informational role of trading with a larger initial price impact is 
observed following macroeconomic announcements. Mizrach and Neely (2007) find that 
the employment, PPI, CPI and durable goods orders releases produce the greatest impact 
on the U.S. Treasury bonds. Chatrath et al. (2009) provide supporting evidence that the 
largest adjustments in the inventory component are made following macroeconomic 
announcements, towards the start and end of New York trading hours, as well as when 
transaction sizes are large. He et al. (2009) find that information asymmetry is higher in 
the opening period of the New York market (8:30am-9:00am) during the macroeconomic 
announcement days. Using eSpeed data, Dungey et al. (2008) examine the price volatility 
and trading volume in each one-minute interval around the 8:30 am announcement time 
in the 10-year T -notes market. They find that price volatility and trading volume do not 
vary around 8:30am on non-announcement days while price volatility and trading volume 
increase immediately following the macroeconomic announcements. 
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We extend previous literature by providing statistics for trading volume, trading 
frequency, trade size, quote-size, daily absolute number of trades and bid-ask spread in 
the U.S. Treasury market for non-announcement and announcement days conditional on a 
high dispersion of beliefs among investors. The Treasury data from GovPX, which is 
used in most previous studies, contains only the trading information for the best bid and 
ask, from which we cannot obtain information about the dispersion of beliefs among 
investors. This thesis takes advantage of the newly available high-frequency Treasury 
data from the electronic trading platform eSpeed that contains trading information of six 
tiers, which enables us to calculate the daily order book slope and to measure the daily 
dispersion of beliefs among investors. 
2.3 Informed Trading and Order Aggressiveness 
The trades by liquidity traders may create a noise in the return predictability of trade 
imbalance. This thesis contributes to current literature on trade imbalance estimation by 
differentiating informed trades from liquidity trades based on aggressive (informed) 
orders and estimating the trade imbalance based on informed trades only. The trade 
imbalance calculated by informed trades can better represent the position that the 
informed traders take, which should be more informative on future returns. 
The U.S. Treasury data we use is obtained from the eSpeed electronic platform, which is 
an order-driven market. In an order-driven market, there is no centralized decision maker, 
so that prices arise from the interaction ofa large number of traders (Rosu, 2010). It is of 
great interest to study the relationship between prices and the position that informed 
traders take. Being motivated by Abad and Rubia (2004) and Harris and Hasbrouck 
(1996), who show that aggressive orders are submitted mainly by informed traders, we 
develop a methodology to differentiate informed trades from liquidity trades based on 
order aggressiveness. We believe that informed traders with short-lived information are 
more likely to act impulsively and place aggressive orders. 
However, whether informed traders are more likely to trade aggressively is a 
controversial issue in the existing literature. Foster and Viswanathan (1990) suggest that 
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low volume and high volatility are related to informed trading. Easley and O'Hara (1992) 
suggest that since large orders can reveal more information, informed investors may split 
their orders into smaller amounts in order to trade without information disclosure. Beber 
and Caglio (2005) find that the orders are less aggressive when there is a higher 
probability of information-based trading, suggesting that informed traders are more likely 
to use less aggressive orders in the NYSE. Lo and Sapp (2007) find that dealers are more 
likely to break large orders into a string of smaller orders to more gradually reveal their 
information in the foreign exchange market. 
On the other hand, Glosten (1994) and Seppi (1997) suggest that with short-lived private 
information, informed traders are impatient and prefer a more aggressive order, market 
orders, instead of limit orders. Griffiths et al. (2000) demonstrate that aggressive orders 
are associated with a greater price impact. Abad and Rubia (2004 ) find that the order 
aggressiveness is closely related to an informed trading process in which prices are 
updated. Most aggressive orders are likely submitted by informed traders. The more 
aggressive the order is, the more information is conveyed. They provide statistical 
evidence that the arrivals of a particular type of aggressive order impose the highest 
revision in mid-quotes. Lo and Coggins (2006) suggest that traders can be divided into 
informed and uninformed traders in the market microstructure literature. Informed traders 
would want to trade larger quantities when they have valuable information. Ma et al. 
(2007) provide evidence that trades with large volumes are associated with a higher 
probability of informed trading in an order-driven market. 
This thesis conducts regression analyses to examine the relationship between aggressive 
orders and informed trades. We consider aggressive orders5 as proxy for informed trades 
and estimate trade imbalance by using aggressive trades. If informed traders are more 
likely to place aggressive orders when they possess private information, the return 
predictability of trade imbalance estimated by aggressive orders should increase. Return 
predictability of trade imbalance is a better measure for the relationship between 
aggressive orders and informed trading, since this measure directly investigates the 
5 We define the informed trades in section 4.2 in more details. 
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information content of the aggressive trades. If an aggressive trade is a good proxy for an 
informed trade, trade imbalance estimated by aggressive trades should be more 
informative on future returns. Hence, the results from this thesis will help us better 
understand whether informed traders are more likely to trade aggressively. 
2.4 Dispersion of Beliefs 
This thesis investigates how the dispersion of beliefs among investors affects the return 
predictability of trade imbalance in the U.S. Treasury market. Dispersion of beliefs can 
arise in the Treasury market because investors can have different interpretations of the 
public news. Green (2004) suggests that price movement in the Treasury market is 
induced by the dispersion in traders' interpretation of public news. He finds that the 
informational role of trading significantly increases following economic announcements, 
indicating that the release of public information increases the level of information 
asymmetry in the government bond market. Their results suggest that information 
asymmetry in the government bond market arises not from the lack of relevant public 
information, but from differences in the ability of market participants to interpret the 
information. Based on the MRR6 model, Green (2004) shows that the sensitivity of prices 
to trade imbalance depends on the prevailing level of information asymmetry. He et al. 
(2009) agree that information asymmetry in the Treasury market is mainly derived from 
the heterogeneous interpretation of public information. Different abilities to analyze the 
public news create information asymmetry among traders. Based on the MRR model, 
they find that the trade imbalance contains more information when there is higher 
asymmetric information. 
Standard deviation of macroeconomic forecasts can be used to measure the information 
asymmetry during macroeconomic announcements. The forecasts represent the 
professionals' views on the upcoming announcements. Thus, the standard deviation of 
forecasts indicates how the opinions differ among the professionals. A high standard 
deviation of macroeconomic forecasts represents a high level of information asymmetry, 
6 See Green (2004): MRR model (Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans) is a generalized version of earlier 
microstructure models, which attributes transaction price changes to unanticipated public information and 
microstructure effects, and decomposes effective spreads into absolute components rather than relative 
spread shares. 
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while a low standard deviation indicates a low level of information asymmetry. Diether et 
al. (2002), Kallberg and Pasquariello (2008), Green (2004) and Pasquariello and Vega 
(2007) use the standard deviation among professional forecasts as a measure of 
dispersion of beliefs across sophisticated investors in the stock market. Pasquariello and 
Vega (2007) find that a greater dispersion of beliefs among speculators reduces market 
liquidity during announcement days only when the public information is noisy. They 
provide evidence that unanticipated trade imbalance is more highly correlated with bond 
yield changes, indicating that the informativeness of trade imbalance is positively related 
to the dispersion of investor beliefs. 
Alternatively, Naes and Skjeltorp (2006) use order book slope to estimate the dispersion 
of beliefs among investors in the equity market. They measure the order book slope by 
the average elasticity of the supply and demand schedules in the order book. The steep 
order book slope indicates that there is a high degree of agreement among investors about 
the fair value of an asset while a gentle order book slope indicates that there is greater 
disagreement among investors about the fair value of an asset. The intuition behind this is 
that the more gentle (steeper) the slope is, the more dispersed (concentrated) the volumes 
in the order book are, which reflects more (less) dispersion of beliefs among investors. 
They find that the number of trades and price volatility are negatively related to the order 
book slope, indicating that when there is more dispersion of beliefs, there are more trades 
and price volatility. Jiang and Lo (2008) estimate the dispersion of beliefs using order 
book slope in the U.S. Treasury market. They argue that the standard deviation across 
professional forecasts in previous literature may not be a good measure of dispersion of 
beliefs among investors since the forecast is stale between the forecast release date and 
announcement release date. In addition, the forecast is made on the value of the 
macroeconomic indicators but not directly on the value of an asset. However, the order 
book slope measures the dispersion of beliefs among investors directly on an asset value 
itself. Thus, we argue that the order book slope is a better measure of dispersion of beliefs 
among investors on the fair value of an asset. In addition, the limit order book is placed 
by real money and should more accurately reflect private beliefs. Jiang and Lo (2008) 
find that the highest group of PIT (probability of informed trading) is associated with the 
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gentlest order book slope for the 2-,5- and 10-year U.S. Treasury notes. Duong and Kalev 
(2008) investigate the infonnation content of the limit order book in the Australian Stock 
Exchange. Based on a GARCH model, they find that the order book slope is negatively 
related to future price volatility, which indicates that when there is more dispersion of 
beliefs, there is higher price volatility. Moshirian et al. (2009) provide supporting 
evidence that the relation between price volatility and the order book slope enhances as 
the intensity of public infonnation arrivals increases. They also show that the slope of the 
demand curve over the supply curve of the order book could predict half-hour stock 
returns in the Australian Securities Exchange, which is consistent with the notion in 
Glosten (1994) and Beber and Caglio (2005) that the order book contains infonnation on 
pnces. 
To our knowledge, this is the first study that examines the reaction of Treasuries to 
macroeconomic indicators conditional on high dispersion of beliefs when dispersion is 
measured by the order book slope. Since the slope measure should be a better proxy for 
the dispersion of beliefs following macroeconomic announcements, results in this study 
should improve our understanding of how the U.S. Treasuries react to public infonnation. 
15 
3. Data Description 
3.1 Macroeconomic Announcement Data 
The data of Macroeconomic announcements, macroeconomic consensus data, and 
consensus range are obtained from Econoday online. The consensus data is the median of 
professional forecasts for an upcoming macroeconomic release. Econoday Online is a 
subscription-based online resource that reports U.S. economic and U.s. Treasury events. 
Econoday begins each day reading Market Focus, which highlights the events of critical 
importance of that day. Updates of announcements are posted in Econoday, including 
consensus and actual release data accompanied by unbiased, jargon-free, market-focused 
analysis written by their team of economists. 7 The sample for the sixteen macroeconomic 
announcements covers the periods from June 2005 to May 2008. We provide a brief 
explanation for each of the sixteen macroeconomic indicators in Appendix 1. The release 
time, frequency and source about the announcements are presented in Appendix 2. 
3.2 U.S. Treasury Data 
The source of the U.S. Treasury data is eSpeed founded by Cantor Fitzgerald and Co, 
which is an electronic trading system that automatically matches buy and sell orders at 
specified prices. Most of the previous research on the U.S. Treasury market used treasury 
data from voice-assisted brokers, as reported by GovPX. As Fleming and Mizrach (2009) 
mention, GovPX receives market information from IDBs (lnterdealer brokerages) and 
releases the information in real time through the internet and data vendors. However, in 
more recent years, the voice-assisted trading which GovPX represents has been largely 
replaced by electronic trading. Electronic trading has begun to dominate in many 
financial markets, such as equities, foreign exchange, and most recently, the U.S. 
Treasuries. Cantor Fitzgerald and BrokerTec account for most of the market share in 
recent years. 8 Mizrach and Neely (2006) show that Cantor Fitzgerald is the second 
largest IDB in the overall secondary Treasury market, following BrokerTec (lCAP). 
Mizrach and Neely (2006) estimate that BrokerTec accounts for 61 % of trading activity 
in on-the-run securities and eSpeed 39%. Thus, we believe that eSpeed data is a good 
7 Source from Econoday 
8 See Mizrach and N eely(2006) for details 
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representative of the U.S. Treasury market. Moreover, eSpeed offers a real-time graphic-
enhanced quotation system with an accurate historical database. The timing of the eSpeed 
dataset is accurate to a millisecond, while the timing of Gov-PX dataset is accurate to 
seconds. We believe that the eSpeed data of Cantor is more representative of the market 
since not only its timing is more accurate, but it also includes six tiers of the quotes and 
sIzes. 
The U.S. Treasury market is the largest and most active debt market in the world. A great 
number of Treasury securities are traded every business day. The U.S. Treasury market 
consists of primary and secondary markets, involving numerous participants - the 
Department of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve System, government dealers and 
brokers, and other holders of Treasury securities.9 The trading in the secondary market 
for U.S. Treasury securities takes place 22-23 hours a day, five days a week. According 
to Fleming (1997), the global trading times for the U.S. Treasury market is as follows: (1) 
the trading begins in Tokyo at local time 8:30 am (7:30 pm ET), and continues to local 
time 4 pm in Tokyo (3 am ET), (2) London trading begins at local time 8 am (3 am ET), 
and continues to local time 12:30 pm in London (7:30 am ET), (3) New York trading 
begins at 7:30am ET and continues until 5:30 pm ET. 10 
This thesis analyzes trading in the U.S. Treasury market on the basis of the newly 
available and high-frequency intraday data from eSpeed, for the periods between June 1, 
2005 and May 30,2008. eSpeed is a fully automated electronic trading platform where 
buyers are matched to sellers without human intervention. The data record is created 
whenever the trading system publishes a market update, including six levels of limit order 
book, market state and volume. The trading process on the eSpeed platform follows an 
auction-based model. The trading system accepts bids and asks at multiple price levels 
for the same security. Bids and asks are passive orders. A trade begins when a seller 
(buyer) aggresses on an existing bid (ask). Once a trade starts, participants can take part 
in a work-up stage, buying or selling more volume at the trade price. 
9 See the Federal Reserve Bulletin December 1999 
10 See Fleming (1997) 
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3.3 Macroeconomic Surprises 
We calculate macroeconomic surprises by taking the differences between actual 
announcement releases and their consensus value. Further, we standardize the resulting 
surprises by dividing each of them by their sample standard deviation for each 
announcement. The reason for standardization is to compare the surprise across different 
announcements. The macroeconomic surprise associated with the macroeconomic 
indicator j at time t is shown as 
(1) 
Where Ajt is the actual macroeconomic statistic of announcement, 11 jt denotes the 
corresponding consensus value, and ~ is the sample standard deviation of Ajt - I1jt for 
announcement j. 
In section 5.1, we provide descriptive statistics for the 8:30 am announcement days with 
high macroeconomic surprises. If there is more than one 8:30am announcement on the 
same day, we calculate the daily macroeconomic surprise by taking the average of 
different 8:30am announcement surprises as follows: 
(2) 
3.4 Forecast Range 
We calculate the standardized range for the macroeconomic surveys as follows: 
(3) 
Where Hjdt is the highest professional forecast value for announcement j on day d and 
time t, Ljdt is the lowest professional forecast value of announcement j on day d and 
..time t, stdj is the sample standard deviation of Hjdt - Ljdt for announcement j. 
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In section 5.1.8, Table 23, we provide order book statistics for the announcement periods 
with high and low forecast ranges. If there is more than one macroeconomic 
announcement released at the same time t and on the same day d, we calculate the 
forecast range on day d and time t by taking the average of those different forecast ranges 
for that day d and time t: 




4. Methodology and Model Development 
4.1 The Order Book Slope 
We use the daily order book slope as a proxy for the dispersion of beliefs among 
investors. The current literature, Diether et al. (2002), Kallberg and Pasquariello (2008), 
Green (2004), and Pasquariello and Vega (2007), use the standard deviation across 
professional forecasts as a measure of dispersion of beliefs across sophisticated investors 
in the stock market. However, the standard deviation as a proxy for dispersion of beliefs 
may be misleading in the Treasury market since the forecast is stale between the forecast 
release date and announcement date, and the forecast is not based on the fair value of the 
asset itself. 
Motivated by Naes and Skjeltorp (2006), we use the daily order book slope to measure 
the dispersion of beliefs among investors. The order book slope should be more directly 
related to the dispersion of opinions than to analysts' forecasts. Essentially, the order 
book slope measures the elasticity describing how the quantity supplied in the order book 
changes as a function of the price. 11 
We estimate the daily order book slope based on the eight hourly spaced snapshots of the 
order book: at 8:30am, 9:30am, 10:30am, 11 :30am, 12:30pm, 13:30pm, 14:30pm, and 
15:30pm. First, we calculate the aggregate volume supplied (demanded) for each tier at 
the end of each hourly interval. For example, for the first tier, the aggregate volume is 
equal to the volume in the first tier; for the second tier, the aggregate volume is equal to 
the sum of volumes in the first tier and the second tier; similarly, for the fifth tier, 
aggregate volume is equal to the sum of all the volumes in all five tiers. Second, we take 
the logarithm of the aggregate volume. Third, we obtain an average slope for the bid and 
ask sides for respective snapshots based on the aggregate volume and price at each tier. 
Fourth, we take the average of the bid and ask slope to get one slope measure for each 
snapshot. Finally, we take the average of the eight snapshots to obtain a daily average 
slope. 
11 See Naes and Skjeltorp( 2006) 
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The order book slope at the end of each hourly interval is given by: 
SEs + DEs 
SLOPEi = t 2 t (s = 1,2 ... 8), (5) 
where SEi and DEi is the order book slope of the supply side and the demand side for 
each snapshot. s indicates the snapshot. The order book slope of the ask side is given by: 
A 
vt Na-1 
VT+l 1 1 +L VA -SEi=- T (s = 1,2 ... 8). pt A Na PT+1 
p~ - 1 T=l pf - 1 






T (s = 1,2 ... 8), 
(6) 
(7) 
where Na and Nb is the total number of bid and ask prices at tick levels containing 
orders, which are equal to five in this thesis. Although our data contains the order book 
for six tiers, we find that there is only a small number of observations in the sixth tier. 
Thus, we only use the first five tiers to calculate the order book slope. r is the tick level, 
where r = 0 denotes the bid and ask mid-point and r = 1 denotes the bid and ask quotes 
in the first tier with positive volumes. vi' and v! represent the logarithm of the 
aggregate volume at tick level r for the ask side and bid side respectively. p¢ and 
pf represent the ask and bid quote at tick level r, respectively. To avoid zero in the 
denominator, we select the observations where the bid price is not equal to the ask price 
in the first tier, and where the bid and ask volume at the first level is larger than 1. 
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Finally, the daily slope of the order book on day t is calculated as: 
8 
lISES+DES SLOPE = _ t t 
t 8 2 
s=l 
(s = 1,2 ... 8) (8) 
A gentler slope indicates a wider range of quotes for a given volume and more diverse 
opinions over the value of the Treasury notes and bonds. An example to illustrate the 
calculation of order book slope is given in the following table. 
Snapshot 1: June 03, 2005 Snapshot at 8:30am 
Ask Price Volume mid-quote 
tier 1 100.023 40 99.996 
tier 2 100.031 1 
tier 3 100.039 20 
tier 4 100.109 23 
tier 5 100.219 15 
Snapshot 2: June 16,2005 Snapshot at 8:30am 
Ask Price Volume mid-quote 
tier 1 99.586 15 99.582 
tier 2 99.594 7 
tier 3 99.602 75 
tier 4 99.609 2 
tier 5 99.617 2 
The table shows the ask price and volume for five tiers. The first snapshot is from June 
03,2005, which was a macroeconomic announcement day with a high dispersion of 
beliefs. The second snapshot is from June 16,2005, which was a macroeconomic 
announcement day with low dispersion of beliefs. The calculation of the order book slope 
for the two snapshots is as follows. 
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Order book slope for snapshot 1: 
{ 
log(l + 40) _ 1 Iog(15 + 23 + 20 + 1 + 40) _ I} 
1 loge 40) loge 40) log(23 + 20 + 1 + 40) 
SE = '5 100.023 + 100.031 _ 1 + ... + 100.219 
99.996 - 1 100.023 100.109 - 1 
= 1492 
Order book slope for snapshot 2: 
{ 
log(7 + 15) _ 1 log(2 + 2 + 75 + 7 + 15) _ I} 
1 loge 15) Iog(15) log(2 + 75 + 7 + 15) 
SE = '5 99.586 + 99.594 _ 1 + ... + 99.617 
99.582 - 1 99.586 99.609 - 1 
= 7603 
The ask order book slope for snapshot 1 is gentler than that for snapshot 2. A gentler 
slope indicates that market participants submit their orders over a wider range of quotes 
for a given volume, which shows a more diverse private opinion over the value of the 
Treasury note. Thus, the ask order book slope for snapshot 1 indicates a higher dispersion 
of beliefs among investors, while the ask order book slope for snapshot 2 shows a lower 
dispersion of beliefs. 
4.2 Order Aggressiveness and Filtered Trade Imbalance 
In order to examine the return predictability of trade imbalance based on informed trades, 
this thesis identifies the aggressive (informed) trades and estimates the trade imbalance 
by using aggressive trades. We consider trades with a higher degree of aggressiveness as 
a proxy for the informed trades. Abad and Rubia (2004) argue that the order 
aggressiveness is closely related to informed trading. Most aggressive orders are likely to 
be submitted by informed traders. The more aggressive the order is, the more information 
is conveyed. 
This thesis ranks orders based on their degrees of aggressiveness. Aggressive traders are 
usually impatient to trade. Investors want to trade at any given price and demand a larger 
quantity than that available at the prevailing best quotes. However, investors with less 
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aggressiveness demand a lower quantity than that available at the current best quotes. We 
define two types of orders according to different degrees of aggressiveness: Al is the 
most aggressive orders. In that case, investors are usually impatient to trade. They trade 
at the first tier and continue to trade in other tiers until they buy or sell their desired 
quantity. A2 is the less aggressive orders. Traders using A2 orders are patient and 
conservative. They place orders at the first tiers, but do not continue to trade in other 
tiers. 
Furthermore, we rank all the trades into four groups based on their trade size. The first 
group with the largest trade sizes is defined as the large category (L). The next group 
with the second and third largest trade sizes is defined as the medium category (M). The 
third group with small trade sizes is defined as the small category (S). Then, if a trader 
places Al orders in a large category (L), we define the orders as AlL. Similarly, if Al 
trades fall into the medium category (M) or small category (S), we define them as AlM 
and AlS, respectively. 
Finally, we use AlL and AlM orders as a proxy for the informed trades. The trade 
imbalance TIBAl is defined as the buyer initiated trades of AIL and AIM minus seller 
initiated trades of AIL and AIM. 
4.3 Price Impact of Trade Imbalance 
The price impact coefficient is a popular measure of market liquidity (Fleming, 2003). 
Trade imbalance contains important information and has direct impact on the current 
price changes. Price impact coefficient measures the effect of trade imbalance on price 
changes. High price-impact is associated with low liquidity. Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) 
and Chordia et al. (2008) suggest that effect of trade imbalance on the prices is stronger 
when the liquidity is lower. We examine the price impact of the treasuries in the eSpeed 
electronic market and compare with the results in Fleming (2003), which examines the 
price impact of trade imbalance using GovPX data. We expect that the price impact of 
eSpeed data is lower than GovPX data, since the eSpeed electronic trading platform is a 
more liquid market. Similar to the previous studies (Chordia et al. 2008), we regress five-
minute price changes on the trade imbalance within each five-minute interval. 
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The following regression measures the relationship between trade imbalance (TIB) and 
price changes for 2-year, 5-year, 10-year notes and 30-year bonds for the period from 
June 1, 2005 to May 30, 2008 during the U.S. trading hours between 8:00am ET to 5:00 
pm ET. We divided the trading hours into 108 five-minute intervals. The price changes 
are calculated using the mid-quotes at the end of each five-minute interval. TIB is defined 
in two different ways (TIBNUM and RELTIBNUM). TIBNUM is the number of buyer-
initiated trades minus the number of seller-initiated trades in five-minute interval. 
RELTIBNUM is the number of buyer-initiated trades minus the number of seller-initiated 
trades, divided by the total number of trades in five-minute interval. The model is defined 
as follows: 
(9) 
where coefficient ¢ indicate the price impact of trade imbalance on price changes. The 
results are presented in Table 24. 
4.4 Daily Regression of Returns on Trade Imbalance and Order Book Imbalance 
This section examines the information content of the daily trade imbalance and order 
book imbalance on the Treasury returns. Furthermore, we investigate how the 
macroeconomic announcements, informed trading and dispersion of beliefs among 
investors influence the informativeness of trade imbalance in predicting the U.S. 
Treasury returns. Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) find a positive relation between 
lagged daily imbalance and returns in the stock market, which reverses sign after 
controlling for the current imbalance. They argue that the negative relation between 
returns and lagged trade imbalance after controlling for the current trade imbalance is due 
to the fact that the effect of the current imbalance overweighs the impact of current trades 
that are auto-correlated with past trades. 
The following model examines the information content of the trade imbalance estimated 
by aggressive (informed) trades only, which is denoted as TIBAl (explained in section 
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4.2). TIDAl represents the position that the informed traders take, which should be more 
informative for future returns. We expect that lagged TIDAl should be positively related 
to current returns even after controlling for the current trade imbalance. 
The model in this section also controls for the current limit order book imbalance. As 
discussed in Glosten (1994), Beber and Caglio (2005), and Moshirian et al. (2009), limit 
order book contains information on prices. Moshirian et al. (2009) show that the slope of 
demand curve over the supply curve of the order book predicts short-term (30 minutes) 
returns. This thesis estimates the order book imbalance (OlD) in an alternative way. We 
select eight hourly spaced snapshots of the order book, at 8:30am, 9:30am, 10:30am, 
11:30am, 12:30pm, 13:30pm, 14:30pm, and 15:30pm. 
For each snapshot we have the trading volume for five tiers for the demand (bid) side: 
vf, vf·· .. , v~ ; and for the supply (ask) side: vf, vt .. .. , vt . s denotes the snapshots. 
Then order book imbalance for each snapshot is denoted as: 
5 5 
OIB s = I v: -I vt (5 = 1,2 ... 8) (10) 
T=l T=l 
Then, the daily order book imbalance on day t is the sum of the eight OIB snapshots: 
8 
OIBt = IOIB S (11) 
s=l 
An example to illustrate how to calculate order book imbalance for each snapshot is 
given in the following table. The table shows bid and ask prices and quantities for five 
tiers. 
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Ask Price Quantity 
tier 1 $99 8 
tier 2 $100 7 
tier 3 $101 6 
tier 4 $102 5 
tier 5 $103 4 
Bid price Quantity 
tier 1 $98 10 
tier 2 $97 9 
tier 3 $96 8 
tier 4 $95 7 
tier 5 $94 6 
The order book imbalance is calculated as follows: 
01 BS = (10 + 9 + 8 + 7 + 6) - (8 + 7 + 6 + 5 + 4) = 10 
In addition, the regression model also investigates how the dispersion of beliefs affects 
the return predictability of trade imbalance. We include the order book slope dummy ADt 
to investigate how the predictability of daily trade imbalance varies for different degrees 
of dispersion of beliefs among investors. As we explain in section 4.1, daily order book 
slope (which is defined as SLOPEt in section 4.1 equation (8)) is a measure for the daily 
dispersion of beliefs among investors. The gentler the order book slope is, the more 
dispersion there is among investors. Therefore, we rank the daily order book slope for 
400 macroeconomic announcement days. Then we divide those announcement days into 
4, 5, and 6 groups according to the ranking. If the announcement day t belongs to the 
group with the lowest daily order book slope, then dummy ADt equals to 1, otherwise o. 
The model is defined as follows: 
Rt = Po + P1TIBAlt+P2 OIBt + P3 * OIBt * Annt 
+P4 * TIBAl t * ADt + PsTIBAlt- 1 + P6 * TIBAl t - 1 * ADt- 1 + Et (12) 
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Rt is the log changes of the first and last mid-quotes of day t. TI BA1t is the trade 
imbalance estimated by aggressive (informed) trades on day t. 01 Bt is order book 
imbalance on day t. Annt is a dummy variable which equals to 1 when there is a 
macroeconomic announcement on day t and 0 otherwise. ADt is a dummy variable, which 
equals to 1 when the order book slope is in the bottom group ( 114, 115 or 116) on 
announcement days, and equals to 0 otherwise. Weare interested in the sign of P6 
coefficient. If the trade imbalance estimated by informed trades on high dispersion 
announcement days predicts returns on the day following the announcement day, we 
expect P6 to be significantly positive. This regression analysis is conducted for 2-year, 5-
year, 10-year notes and 30-year bonds for the period from June 1,2005 to May 30,2008 
during the u.s. trading hours (7:30 am to 5:30 pm ET). 
4.5 Return Predictability of Trade Imbalance 
In this section, we examine the return predictability of trade imbalance, without 
controlling for current trade imbalance. In addition, we examine the information content 
of the daily trade imbalance estimated by aggregate trades and daily trade imbalance 
estimated by informed trades. We estimate informed trades based on aggressive orders, 
defined in section 4.2. If aggressive orders represent the position that informed traders 
take, aggressive orders should be informative on future returns. Moreover, Jiang and Lo 
(2008) find that the highest group of PIT (probability of informed trading) is associated 
with the gentlest order book slope, which indicates that more dispersion of beliefs among 
investors is associated with more informed trading. Moshirian et al. (2009) argue that 
macroeconomic announcements that are hard to interpret induce a high dispersion of 
beliefs among investors, which offer advantages for the skilled traders who have private 
information. We expect that, during the macroeconomic announcement days with high 
dispersion of beliefs, daily trade imbalance estimated by informed trades predicts returns 
on the day following the announcement day. This regression analysis is conducted for 2-
year, 5-year, 10-year notes and 30-year bonds for the period from June 1,2005 to May 
30, 2008 during the U.S. trading hours (7:30 am to 5:30 pm ET). We define the model as 
follows: 
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Rt = Po + P1T1Bt-l +P2 TIBAl t_1 + P3T1Bt-l * ADt- 1 + P4TIBAlt-l 
* ADt - 1 + Et 
(13) 
Rt is the log changes of the first and last mid-quotes of day t. TI Bt - 1 is the daily trade 
imbalance which is equal to buyer initiated trades minus seller initiated trades on day t-l. 
TIBAl t- 1 is the trade imbalance estimated by informed trades on day t-1. ADt- 1 is a 
dummy variable, which is equal to 1 when the order book slope is in the bottom group 
(1/4, 1/5 or 1/6) on announcement days, and is equal to 0 otherwise. We are interested in 
the significance and sign of P4 coefficient. We expect P4 to be significantly positive if 
informed trade imbalance on announcement days with high dispersion of beliefs predicts 
returns on the day following the announcement day. 
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5. Descriptive Statistic and Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistic 
This section examines the market liquidity for the Treasury market, which is traded in the 
eSpeed electronic platform for 2-year, 5-year, 10-year notes and 30-year bonds for the 
period from June 1,2005 to May 30, 2008. We report different measures of the market 
liquidity for all the announcement days and non-announcement days, announcement days 
with high macroeconomic surprise and announcement days with high dispersion of 
beliefs among investors. Announcement days (400 days) are defined as those with 
morning or afternoon announcements. Non-announcement days (350 days) are those with 
no morning or afternoon announcements. Announcement days with high macroeconomic 
surprise are defined as 8:30am announcement days with top 30% macroeconomic 
surprise12 (100 days). Announcement days with high dispersion of beliefs are those 
announcement days with daily order book slope l3 that is in the bottom 114 among all the 
announcement days (100 days). We report the p-values from t-statistic and wilcoxon 
signed rank statistic to compare means and medians for announcement and non-
announcement days. As discussed in section 2.4, order book slope should be a better 
measure of market uncertainty, since it directly captures the investors' opinions on the 
fair value of the asset while the macroeconomic surprise represents the uncertainty of the 
investors on the macroeconomic indicators' value. Thus, the descriptive statistics for the 
announcement days with high dispersion of beliefs should be more representative for the 
trading activity of the periods with high level of market uncertainty. 
5.1.1 Trading Volume 
This section presents the descriptive statistics for the unconditional and conditional daily 
trading volume. For the unconditional trading volume, we provide the statistics for daily 
trading volume for all announcement days and non-announcement days. For the 
conditional trading volume, we focus on the announcement days conditional on high 
macroeconomic surprise and high dispersion of beliefs among investors. 
12 Surprise measure is defined in section 3.3, equation (2). 
l3 Daily order book slope is specified in section 4.1, equation (8). 
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5.1.1.1 Announcement and Non-Announcement Days 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on mean and median daily trading volume for the 
indicated on-the-run securities in millions of U.S. dollars for Tokyo, London and U.S. 
trading hours, for both announcement days and non-announcement days. The U.S. 
trading hours is shown to have a more liquid trading period than Tokyo and London 
trading hours. For 2-year notes, mean (median) daily trading volume is $26485 ($24929) 
million, while it is only $412 ($327) million and $1701 ($1514) million for the Tokyo 
and London trading, respectively. Moreover, the 2-year notes are shown to be the most 
actively traded bonds among the four treasury securities and the trading volume decreases 
with maturity. This finding is consistent with Fleming (2003), which conducts the 
analysis based on GovPX data and reports that 2-year notes is the most actively traded 
Treasury notes among the 2-year, 5-year and 10-year Treasury notes. It is also consistent 
with the results in Fleming and Mizrach (2009), which conduct the analysis based on data 
from BrokerTec electronic Platform and show that 2-year notes are the most actively 
traded Treasury notes and the trading volume decreases monotonically with maturity. In 
addition, Fleming (2003) reports the mean (median) trading volume of$6810 ($6670) 
million for the 2-year notes in the interdealer market during the U.S. trading hours. 
Compared to Fleming's results, the mean (median) daily trading volume of $26485 
($24929) million for 2-year notes in the eSpeed electronic market is dramatically greater. 
This finding provides supporting evidence that eSpeed electronic market is much more 
active than the GovPX interdealer market. 
In addition, Table 1 indicates that daily trading volume significantly increases on 
announcement days during London and U.S. trading hours. The mean (median) daily 
trading volume for the 2-year notes increases from $1537 ($1346) million on non-
announcement days to $1701 ($1514) million on announcements days during London 
trading hours. Both the mean and median tests show that the differences are significant at 
5% level. The mean (median) daily trading volume for the 2-year notes increases from 
$22079 ($20124) million on non-announcement days to $26485 ($24929) million on 
announcements days during U.S. trading hours, and both the mean and median tests show 
that the differences are significant at all levels. This finding is consistent with the 
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previous literature that trading volume increases on announcement days (Green et aI., 
2001; Dungey et aI., 2008). When there is a public information arrival, the market 
(liquidity traders and informed traders) reacts to the new information by increasing the 
trading volume. 
5.1.1.2 Announcement and Non-Announcement Days Conditional on Surprise and 
Dispersion of Beliefs 
In addition, we compare the mean and median daily trading volume on announcement 
days with top 30% macroeconomic surprises to the ones on non-announcement days in 
Table 2. The statistics shows that the average daily trading volume significantly increases 
for the 2-year, 5-year, 10-year notes and 30-year bonds on announcement days with top 
30% macroeconomic surprises during the U.S. trading hours. Both the mean and median 
tests show that the difference between the announcement days with top 30% 
macroeconomic surprises and the non-announcement days are significant at all levels for 
the u.S. trading hours, but it is not significant for the Tokyo and London trading hours. 
The macroeconomic surprises reflect the market uncertainty in response to the 
announcements. Kim et al (2004) argue that it may not be the act of releasing information 
to the market that is important, but the extent to which the actual announcement differs 
from the expected value which determines the response of the market to the new 
information. Balduzzi (2001) finds that the information role of trading is associated with 
the surprise component of the announcements and the precision of the public information. 
Thus, during the announcement days with high macroeconomic surprises, market 
uncertainty is higher, which offers advantages to the informed traders who have skills to 
interpret the announcements better. In tum, with short-lived information, informed 
traders speculate and contribute to the increase in trading volume following the 
announcements. 
Finally, Table 3 shows the mean and median daily trading volume on the announcement 
days with high dispersion of beliefs and on non-announcement days. The statistics show 
that, on the announcement days with high dispersion of beliefs, average daily trading 
volume increases significantly for the 2-year and 5-year notes during the Tokyo and 
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London trading hours, and for the 2-year, 5-year and IO-year notes during the U.S. 
trading hours. Both the mean and median tests show that the difference is significant at 
all levels. For example, for the 2-year notes during the U.S. trading hours, the mean daily 
trading volume increases by 46% (32336-22079) on the announcement days with high 
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dispersion of beliefs compared to the non-announcement days. 
Naes and Skjeltorp (2006) also show that trading volume and volatility is higher when the 
dispersion of beliefs among investors is greater in the stock market. They suggest that the 
increased trading volume can be attributed to both uninformed traders and informed 
investors. The fact that volume significantly increases during Tokyo and London trading 
(i.e., before the release of macroeconomic indicators) provide supporting evidence that 
during announcement days with high dispersion of beliefs skilled traders might speculate 
on the announcements that are hard to interpret and increase trading volume before the 
announcements. 
5.1.2 Trading Frequency 
This section presents the descriptive statistics for unconditional and conditional daily 
trading frequency. For the unconditional trading frequency, we provide statistics for 
announcement and non-announcement days. For the conditional daily trading frequency, 
we focus on the announcement days conditional on high macroeconomic surprise and 
high dispersion of beliefs among investors. 
5.1.2.1 Announcement and Non-Announcement Days 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics on the daily number of trades for the indicated on-the 
-run securities for Tokyo, London and U.S. trading hours, for both announcement and 
non-announcement days. The results show that IO-year and 5-year notes are most 
frequently traded among the four securities. This finding is consistent with Fleming 
(2003), which conducts the analysis based on GovPX data and reports that IO-year and 5-
year notes are the most frequently traded notes among the 2-year, 5-year and IO-year 
Treasury notes. The results show that daily number of trades increases significantly on 
announcement days for the 2-year, 5-year, IO-year notes and 30-year bonds during the 
U.S. trading hours. Both the mean and median tests show that the increase is significant. 
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This finding indicates that market reacts to macroeconomic announcements by increasing 
the trading frequency during the U.S. trading hours, which is consistent with Dungey et al 
(2008) that reports an increase in trading frequency after the macroeconomic 
announcements. 
5.1.2.2 Announcement and Non-Announcement Days Conditional on Surprise and 
Dispersion of Beliefs 
In addition, we compare the daily number of trades on announcement days with the top 
30% macroeconomic surprises to the ones on non-announcement days in Table 5. The 
statistics show that the average daily number of trades increases significantly for the 2-
year, 5-year, I O-year notes and 30-year bonds on announcement days with top 30% 
macroeconomic surprises during the U.S. trading hours. However, the increase is not 
apparent in the Tokyo and London trading hours. 
Nevertheless, Table 6 shows that, on the announcement days with high dispersion of 
beliefs, daily number of trades increases significantly for the 2-year, 5-year and 10-year 
notes during the Tokyo and London trading hours, and for the 2-year, 5-year, 10-year 
notes and 30-year bonds during the U.S. trading hours. The increase in Table 6 is more 
dramatic than the increase on announcement days with top 30% macroeconomic surprise 
in Table 5. For example, for the 2-year notes during U.S. trading hour, the mean daily 
trading frequency increases by 111%(1857-879) on the announcement days with high 
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dispersion of beliefs compared to the non-announcement days. This finding indicates that 
during announcements days with high dispersion of beliefs, liquidity traders and skilled 
(informed) traders in the U.S. Treasury market react to the public information stronger by 
increasing the number of trades when the information is harder to interpret. 
5.1.3 Trade Size 
This section presents the descriptive statistics for the unconditional and conditional daily 
trade size. For the unconditional trade size, we provide the statistics for daily trade size 
for all announcements days and non-announcement days. For the conditional daily trade 
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size, we focus on the announcement days with high macroeconomic surprises and high 
dispersion of beliefs among investors. 
5.1.3.1 Announcement and Non-Announcement Days 
Table 7 reports descriptive statistics on mean daily trade sizes for the indicated on-the-
run securities in millions of U.S. dollars for Tokyo, London and U.S. trading hours, for 
both announcement days and non-announcement days. We observe that the mean 
(median) daily trade size decreases monotonically with maturity, from $29.4 ($29.6) 
million for the 2-year notes to $3 (3) million for the 3D-year bond, which is also 
consistent with the findings in Fleming (2003). The U.S. trading hour is shown to have a 
larger trade size than the Tokyo and London trading hours. Comparing announcement 
days with non-announcement days, the mean and median tests show that daily trade sizes 
on announcement days increase significantly only for the five-year and ten-year notes 
during the U.S. trading hours. 
5.1.3.2 Announcement and Non-Announcement Days Conditional on Surprise and 
Dispersion of Beliefs 
Table 8 reports mean and median daily trade sizes on the 8:30 am announcement days 
with top 30% macroeconomic surprises and on non-announcement days. The mean test 
shows that, during Tokyo trading hours, the trade size for 5-year notes decreases 
significantly at 0.05 levels on the 8:30am announcement days with top 30% 
macroeconomic surprises. The median test shows that, during Tokyo and U.S. trading 
hour, trade size for 10-year notes decreases significantly at 5% level on the 8:30am 
announcement days with top 30% macroeconomic surprises. 
However, Table 9, which reports the mean and median daily trade sizes on the 
announcement days with high dispersion of beliefs and on the non-announcement days, 
indicates that the mean and median daily trade sizes decrease significantly on the 
announcement days. Both the mean and median tests show that the decrease is significant 
for 2-year, 5-year, 10-year notes and 30-year bonds during all the trading hours. For 
example, for the 2-year notes during U.S. trading hours, the mean daily trade size 
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decreases by 36%(18-28) on the announcement days with high dispersion of beliefs 28 
compared to the non-announcement days. 
Pasquariello and Vega (2007) suggest that periods of greater dispersion of beliefs among 
market participants are accompanied by more cautious trading activity. Therefore, we 
believe that during the periods of greater dispersion of beliefs, the investors are more 
cautious and more likely to place smaller orders. 
5.1.4 Quote Size 
This section presents the descriptive statistics for unconditional and conditional daily 
quote sizes. For the unconditional daily quote sizes, we provide the statistics for daily 
quote size for all announcements days and non-announcement days. For the conditional 
daily quote sizes, we focus on the announcement days with high macroeconomic 
surprises and high dispersion of beliefs among investors. 
5.1.4.1 Announcement and Non-Announcement Days 
Table 10 reports descriptive statistics for mean daily quote sizes for the indicated on-the -
run securities in millions of U.S. dollars for Tokyo, London and U.S. trading hours, for 
both announcement days and non-announcement days. Quote sizes are the quoted sizes 
for the best bid and offer prices in the electronic market. The mean daily figure is 
calculated with both bid and offer quantities. The results show that daily quote sizes 
decrease monotonically with maturity, from $267.3 ($260.6) million for the 2-year notes 
to $6 (5.5) million for the 30-year bond. The U.S. trading hour is shown to have larger 
trade size than the Tokyo and London trading hours. However, comparing announcement 
days with non-announcement days, the mean and median tests show that daily trade sizes 
do not vary significantly between those two periods. 
5.1.4.2 Announcement and Non-Announcement Days Conditional on Surprise and 
Dispersion of Beliefs 
Table 11 reports the mean and median daily quote sizes on announcement days with top 
30% macroeconomic surprises and on non-announcement days. It is shown that the mean 
daily quote sizes do not significantly vary between those two periods. Nevertheless, 
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Table 12, which reports the mean and median daily quote sizes on the announcement 
days with high dispersion of beliefs and on non-announcement days, indicates that the 
mean daily quote sizes decrease significantly for the announcement days. Both the mean 
and median tests show that the decrease is significant for 2-year, 5-year, 10-year notes 
and 30-year bonds during the Tokyo, London and u.s. trading hours at all levels. For 
example, for the 2-year notes during u.s. trading hours, the mean daily quote size 
decreases by 69%(86-279) on the announcement days with high dispersion of beliefs 279 
compared to the non-announcement days. As mentioned earlier, Pasquariello and Vega 
(2007) suggest that periods of greater dispersion of beliefs among market participants are 
accompanied by more cautious trading activity. Therefore, we believe that during the 
periods of greater dispersion of beliefs, the investors are more cautious and reduce quotes 
s1zes. 
5.1.5 Absolute Net Numbers of Trades 
This section presents the descriptive statistics for unconditional and conditional daily 
absolute net number of trades. For the unconditional daily absolute net number of trades, 
we provide the statistics for daily absolute net number of trades for all announcements 
days and non-announcement days. For the conditional daily absolute net number of 
trades, we focus on the announcement days with high macroeconomic surprises and high 
dispersion of beliefs among investors. 
5.1.5.1 Announcement and Non-Announcement Days 
Table 13 reports descriptive statistics on daily absolute net number of trades for the 
indicated on-the -run securities for Tokyo, London and u.s. trading hours, for both 
announcement days and non-announcement days. The daily absolute net number of trades 
is equal to the average of daily absolute net number of trades (absolute value of the buyer 
initiated trades minus the seller initiated trades on each day). The results show that daily 
absolute net number of trades is highest for the 5-year notes and smallest for the 30-year 
bond. The table shows that absolute net number of trades is higher during the U.S. trading 
hours than the Tokyo and London trading hours. Judged from the mean and median 
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values, daily absolute net number of trades do not vary significantly between 
announcement and non-announcement days. 
5.1.5.2 Announcement and Non-Announcement Days Conditional on Surprise and 
Dispersion of Beliefs 
Table 14 reports the mean daily absolute net number of trades on announcement days 
with top 30% macroeconomic surprises and on non-announcement days. It is shown that 
the daily absolute net number of trades does not vary significantly between those two 
periods. However, Table 15 shows that mean daily absolute net number of trades increase 
for the announcement days with high dispersion of beliefs for the 2-year and 5-year 
notes. The increase is more obvious for Tokyo and U.S. trading hours. For example, for 
the 2-year notes during U.S. trading hour, the mean daily absolute net number of trades 
increase by 30%(57-44) on the announcement days with high dispersion of beliefs 44 
compared to the non-announcement days. 
Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) suggest that a large trade imbalance prior to an 
informational event indicates informed trading, while large trade imbalance following the 
information event may reveal a change in investors' expectations. Moreover, Jiang and 
Lo (2008) find that the highest group of PIT (probability of informed trading) is 
associated with the period of high dispersion of beliefs. Since 2-year and 5-year notes are 
most actively traded in the Treasury market, skilled (informed) traders might speculate 
using 2-year and 5-year notes before or after the macroeconomic announcements when 
the announcements are hard to interpret. Thus, we believe that high absolute net number 
of trades in Tokyo and London signals informed trading for the 2-year and 5-year notes 
during the announcement days with high dispersion of beliefs. 
5.1.6 Daily Bid-Ask Spreads 
This section presents the descriptive statistics for unconditional and conditional daily bid-
ask spreads. For the unconditional daily bid-ask spread, we provide the statistics for the 
daily bid-ask spread for all announcements days and non-announcement days. For the 
conditional daily bid-ask spreads, we focus on the announcement days with high 
macroeconomic surprises and high dispersion of beliefs among investors. 
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5.1.6.1 Announcement and Non-Announcement Days 
Table 16 reports descriptive statistics on daily mean bid-ask spreads for the indicated on-
the -run securities in millions of U.S. dollars for Tokyo, London and U.S. trading hours, 
for both announcement days and non-announcement days. It is shown in the table that the 
longer the time to maturity of a Treasury security is, the wider the bid-ask spread is. 
Fleming (2003) suggests that the bid-ask spread is a useful measure for Treasury market 
liquidity. The wider the spread is, the lower the market liquidity is. It is suggested in the 
results that 2-year notes are the most liquid securities and 30-year bonds is the least 
liquid. 
The table shows that the bid-ask spreads decrease from Tokyo trading hours to London 
hours and then to U.S. hours, indicating that the U.S. trading is more liquid than Tokyo 
and London trading. However, both the mean and median tests show that daily bid-ask 
spreads do not vary significantly between the announcement and non-announcement 
days. 
5.1.6.2 Announcement and Non-Announcement Days Conditional on Surprise and 
Dispersion of Beliefs 
Table 17 reports the mean and median daily bid-ask spreads on announcement days with 
top 30% macroeconomic surprises and on the non-announcement days. Mean daily bid-
ask spread does not display significant difference between the announcement days with 
top 30% macroeconomic surprises and non-announcement days. However, Table 18 
shows that the bid-ask spreads for all the maturities considered increases on the 
announcement days with high dispersion of beliefs during all the trading hours. The mean 
test shows that the increase is significant at all levels for the 2-year, 5-year, 10-year notes 
and 30-year bonds during the London and U.S. hour, and it is significant for the 30-year 
bonds during the Tokyo hours. The median test shows that the increase is significant at 
all levels for the 2-year, 5-year, 10-year notes and 30-year bonds for all the trading hours. 
The increase is more obvious for Tokyo and U.S. trading hours. For example, for the 2-
year notes during U.S. trading hour, mean daily bid-ask spread increases by 
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comparing to the non-announcement days. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) suggest that the 
market liquidity decreases when there is a higher dispersion of beliefs among investors, 
resulting in the widening of spreads. They mention that when the number of informed 
trades increases, market makers may suffer an informational disadvantage, which triggers 
them to increase the bid-ask spreads. Thus, we believe that, the widening spread for all 
the maturities during the announcements days with high dispersion is attributed to the 
decrease in market liquidity and increase in information asymmetry. 
5.1.7 Intraday Bid-Ask Spreads 
This section presents the descriptive statistics for the unconditional and conditional 
intraday bid-ask spreads. The reported bid-ask spread is the actual mean proportional 
spread14 times 104 • For the unconditional intraday bid-ask spread, we provide the 
statistics for all 8:30 am announcement days and non-announcement days. For the 
conditional intraday bid-ask spread, we focus on the announcement days with high 
macroeconomic surprises and high dispersion of beliefs among investors. 
5.1.7.1 Announcement and Non-Announcement Days 
Table 19 presents the mean bid-ask spreads for one minute intervals between 8:25 am and 
8:40 am. The bid-ask spread is the mean proportional spread, which equals to the 
differences between the best bid and ask prices divided by the mid-quote. The reported 
bid-ask spread is the actual mean proportional spread times 104 . We report the p-va1ues 
from the t-statistics to compare means for announcement and non-announcement days 
assuming unequal variance. As is shown in Table 19, the spread starts to widen 4 minutes 
before the announcements for the 2-year and 5-year notes, 2 minutes before the 
announcements for the 10-year notes and 5 minutes before the announcements for the 30-
year bond. The spread reaches a peak between 8:29 am and 8:30 am for all the indicated 
Treasury securities. Then the bid-ask spreads revert to normal values 1 to 4 minutes after 
the 8:30 am announcements. The widening of the spreads lasts longer for the 30-year 
bonds among the four securities, which is four minutes. Our findings are consistent with 
14 Mean proportion spread is equal to the bid-ask spread divided by the mid-quote. 
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the pervious literature. Green (2004) conducts the analysis based on GovPX data and 
finds that the average quoted spreads are larger than usual before the economic news 
release and decrease afterwards. Balduzzi et al (2001) also conduct the study based on 
GovPX data and show that the bid-ask spreads widen exactly at the time when the 
announcement is made and reverts to normal levels after five to fifteen minutes. They 
explain that bid ask spreads widen around announcements because bid-ask spread is the 
price of an "option to trade" offered by the market maker to traders. As the 
macroeconomic announcement increases the volatility in the Treasury market, the value 
of option to trade increases, which is reflected by a widening of the spread. When 
compared to our results, the widening of the spreads lasts longer in the case of GovPX 
because the trading is carried out in an interdealer market, which is less liquid than the 
eSpeed electronic market. We believe that the widening of the spread before the 
announcements is due to the increased market uncertainty before the announcements. The 
persistence in wide spreads after the announcements can be explained by the increased 
information asymmetry. 
5.1.7.2 Announcement and Non-Announcement Days Conditional on Surprise and 
Dispersion of Beliefs 
Table 20 reports mean bid-ask spreads for one minute intervals between 8:25 am and 
8:40 am for 8:30 am announcement days with top 30% macroeconomic surprises and 
non-announcement days. The spread displays similar patterns as it is shown in Table 19. 
However, Table 21, which reports the mean bid-ask spreads for one minute intervals for 
the announcement days with high dispersion of beliefs and non-announcement days, 
displays a significantly widening of spreads from 8:25 am to 8:40 am. The widening 
reaches a peak between 8:29 am and 8:30 am for all Treasury notes and bonds. For 
example, for the 2-year notes during the 1 minute interval from 8:29 am to 8:30 am, mean 
bid-ask spread increases by 114%(1.8511-0.8654) on the announcement days with high 
0.8654 
dispersion of beliefs compared to the non-announcement days. 
During the announcement days with high dispersion of beliefs, the announcements are 
not easy to interpret by all the investors, which induce an information asymmetry in the 
41 
market and lead to a decrease in liquidity. Moreover, the announcements, which are hard 
to interpret, offer advantages to the skilled traders. As the number of informed traders 
increase, market makers may suffer an informational disadvantage, which trigger them to 
increase the bid-ask spreads. 
5.1.8 Order Book Slope Statistics 
Summary statistics for daily order book slope for 2-year, 5-year, 10-year notes and 30-
year bonds are shown in Table 22. The sample period is from June 1, 2005 to May 30, 
2008 during the U.S. trading hours. To calculate the ask, bid and order book slopes, we 
apply a similar method to the one shown in section 4.1. The difference is that we estimate 
the slope based on 20 snapshots instead of 8 snapshots. Here, we divide the U.S. trading 
hours from 7:30am to 5:30pm into 20 half-hour intervals. At the end of each interval, we 
calculate the ask slope, bid slope and order book slope using the method in section 4.1.15 
The relative slope is calculated by the relative slope of demand side over supply side. 16 If 
macroeconomic announcements fall into an interval, we regard these periods as 
announcements periods, which is the Ann period in the table. Otherwise, intervals are 
non-announcement periods, which is the Non-Ann period in the in the table. 
Table 22 reports the mean statistics for the ask slope, bid slope, order book slope and 
relative slope for all periods, non-announcement periods and announcement periods. The 
statistics are the actual statistics multiplied by 10-3 . The average order book slope for the 
sample period is 25.14 for 2-year notes, and decline to 17.64 for 5-year note, 9.06 for 10-
year note, and 3.89 for the 30-year bond. The lower order book slope indicates higher 
dispersion of beliefs among investors. The result implies that the longer the maturity of 
the Treasury securities are, the more dispersion of beliefs about the value there is. The 
reason is that when the maturity increases, the uncertainty increases, then the dispersion 
of beliefs increases subsequently. The bid and ask slope display similar patterns. 
However, the relative slope is similar for the four Treasury securities. Moreover, the ask 
15 Ask slope corresponds to 5 Ei, bid slope corresponds to D Et, and order book slope corresponds to 
SLOPEt in section 4.1. 
DES 
16 Relative Slope can be expressed as ~
SEt+DEt 
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slope, bid slope and order book slope are larger for the announcement periods than the 
non-announcement periods. 
This result seems to provide supporting evidence that macroeconomic releases reduce the 
dispersion of beliefs among the investors. The public news arrivals may reduce the 
market uncertainty and information asymmetry among investors on average. However, if 
the macroeconomic announcements are not easy to interpret by the investors, the 
dispersion of beliefs may increase as implied by the previous results in this thesis and the 
results in Table 23. 
Table 23 presents the summary statistics for the order book slope for the announcement 
periods with low forecast range (bottom 20% ) and for those with high forecast 
range I 7 (top 20%). The sample period is from May 31,2007 to May 30,2008 during the 
U.S. trading hours. 18 The table shows that the ask slope, bid slope and order book slope 
are lower for the announcement periods with high forecast range than those with low 
forecast range, indicating that higher dispersion of beliefs is associated with higher 
forecast range. Since forecast range captures the degree of heterogeneity in the 
interpretation of the macroeconomic news, the results in this table imply that the release 
of hard-to-interpret public information increases market uncertainty and information 
asymmetry. 
5.2 Price Impact of the Trade Imbalance 
Based on the eSpeed Treasury data, we examine the price impact of the trade imbalance 
in equation (9). Table 24 reports the price impact coefficients for the 2-year, 5-year, 10-
year notes and 30-year bonds for the period from June 1,2005 to May 30,2008 during 
the U.S. trading hours. The price impact coefficient is positive and significant for all the 
maturities. Panel A presents the results for TIBNUM, which is the number of buyer-
initiated trades minus the number of seller-initiated trades cumulated over the 5-minute 
interval. The price impact coefficient of the 2-year notes is 0.000973 and adjusted R2 is 
0.1159. However, in Fleming (2003), which conducts the analysis based on GovPX data, 
the price impact coefficient is 0.0465 and adjusted R2 is 0.322 for the 2-year note. Since 
17 Forecast range is specified in section 3.4, equation (3) and equation (4). 
18 The forecast range statistic is only available from May 31, 2007 to May 30, 2008. 
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higher price-impact is associated with lower liquidity, the different results between this 
thesis and Fleming (2003) indicate that eSpeed electronic market is much more liquid 
than the interdealer GovPX market. Moreover, the price impact coefficient increases with 
maturity, which is smallest for the 2-year notes and largest for the 30-year bond. These 
results indicate that the market liquidity decrease monotonically from the 2-year notes to 
30-year bond. In addition, the adjusted R2 is highest for IO-year notes and smallest for 
30-year bond, which implies that the trade imbalance of 10-year notes explains more of 
the price changes while 30-year bonds' trade imbalance explains less of the price changes. 
Panel B reports the results for RELTIBNUM, which is the number of buyer-initiated 
trades minus the number of seller-initiated trades, divided by the total number of trades. 
Consistent with Panel A, the price impact coefficient for 2-year notes is the smallest and 
the coefficient for 30-year bonds is the largest. Also, the adjusted R2 is highest for 10-
year notes and smallest for 30-year bond. The adjust R2 statistic is higher in Panel A than 
in Panel B, which indicates that TIBNUM has a higher explanatory power for price 
changes than RELTIBNUM. 
5.3 Daily Regression of Returns on Trade Imbalance and Order Book Imbalance 
Table 25 presents the results for equation (12). The results are for 2-year, 5-year, IO-year 
notes and 30-year bonds for the period from June 1,2005 to May 30,2008 during the 
U.S. trading hours from 7:30am to 5:30pm. Panel A shows the regression results when 
ADt dummy is equal to one for the announcement days with the bottom 114 order book 
slope. Ih is positive and significant at all levels for all the maturities, which implies that 
the current trade imbalance estimated by informed trades is positively and significantly 
related to prices changes. P2 is positive and significant at 1 % level for 2-year notes, and 
significant at 5% level for other maturities. This finding is consistent with the previous 
literature (Glosten 1994; Beber and Caglio 2005; Moshirian et aI2009), which shows that 
limit order book contains information on prices. However, P2 is smaller than P1 for all 
the maturities, which provides evidence that current trade imbalance contains more 
information on returns than the current order book imbalance. P3 reports the impact of 
the current order book imbalances on the returns during the announcement days, which is 
positive for the 2-year, 5-year and IO-year notes, but negative for the 30-year bond, all of 
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them are not significant though. /34 reports the impact of current trade imbalance 
estimated by informed trades on the return, which is positive for the 2-year, but negative 
for 5-year, 10-year notes and 30-year bond, all of them are not significant. /35 measures 
how the lagged trade imbalance estimated by informed trades predicts returns. The 
coefficient is negative for 2-year, 5-year and 10-year notes, and positive for the 30-year 
bonds, and it is only significant for the 2-year note. 
However, the coefficient /36 is positive and significant for all the maturities, except for 
the 30-year bond. /36 is the coefficient that we are interested in, which examines the 
return predictability of the trade imbalance( estimated by informed trades) during the 
announcements with high dispersion of beliefs among investors. This finding provides 
supporting evidence that the aggressive orders capture the private information and is 
more informative in predicating returns. 
The results are consistent with Abad and Rubia (2004), which suggest that aggressive 
orders are associated with informed trading process. During the days with high dispersion 
of beliefs among investors, public information is not easy to interpret by all investors, and 
only the skilled traders can extract private information from the public information 
(Moshiri an et al. 2009). In this case, the prices do not adjust to public information 
immediately and it may take time for the prices to fully reflect the public information. 
Therefore, during the announcements days with high dispersion of beliefs among 
investors, the trade imbalance estimated by informed trades can significantly predict 
returns on the following day. 
Panels Band C show the regression results when ADt dummy is equal to one for the 
announcement days with bottom 1/5 and 1/6 order book slope, respectively. The 
coefficients display similar patterns as they are in Panel A. However, /36 is larger and 
more significant in Panel C than in Panel A and Panel B for 2-year and 5-year notes. This 
finding implies that higher dispersion of beliefs among investors contributes to a stronger 
return predictability of trade imbalance estimated by informed trades. 
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5.4 Return Predictability of Trade imbalance 
In this section, we examine the return predictability of trade imbalance without 
controlling for the current trade imbalance. Table 26 presents the results for equation 
(13). The results are for 2-year, 5-year, 10-year notes and 30-year bonds for the period 
from June 1, 2005 to May 30, 2008 during the U.S. trading hours from 7:30am to 
5 :30pm. Panel A shows the regression results when ADt dummy is equal to one for the 
announcement days with bottom 1/4 order book slope. f31 is negative for 2-year notes 
and positive for 5-year notes, 10-year notes and 30-year bond. However, it is only 
significant for the 2-year notes. T I Bt - 1 is calculated by the aggregate orders, which does 
not differentiate informed trades from liquidity trades. Therefore, there is noise created 
by the liquidity traders, which reduce the return predictability of the trade imbalance. f3z 
reports the return predictability of the trade imbalance estimated by informed trades. It is 
negative for the 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year notes and positive for 3D-year bond, but it is 
only significant for the 2-year note. The negative sign and insignificance of f3z may be 
because during the days without public news arrival, there isn't material information for 
the skilled traders. f33 is not significant for all maturities. However, f34 is positive and 
significant for all maturities, except for 30-year bond. f34 measures the return 
predictability of the trade imbalance estimated by informed trades on announcement days 
when the disagreement about the bond value is in the top 1/4. This finding also confirms 
the results in Table 25 that aggressive orders capture the private information and is more 
informative in predicating returns during the announcement days with high dispersion of 
beliefs among investors. Therefore, the empirical results may show that there may be 
profitable opportunities on the announcement days when macroeconomic announcements 
are hard to interpret. 
Panels Band C show the regression results when ADt dummy is equal to one for the 
announcement days with the bottom 1/5 and 1/6 order book slope, respectively. The 
coefficients display similar patterns as they are in Panel A. Again, f34 , which measures 
the return predictability of informed trades during the announcements with high 
dispersion of beliefs among investors, is larger and more significant in Panel C than in 
Panel A for 2-year and 5-year notes. This finding also implies that the higher the 
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dispersion of beliefs among investors is, the stronger the return predictability of trade 
imbalance estimated by informed trades is. These results indicate that the dispersion of 
beliefs increase the return predictability of the trade imbalance at daily level, which can 
also be explained by the previous literature (Jiang & Lo 2008) that higher dispersion of 
beliefs among investor is related to higher probability of informed trading. 
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6. Trading Strategy 
In the previous section, we show that trade imbalance (based on informed trades) on the 
announcements days with high dispersion of beliefs predicts returns on the following day. 
Based on the regression results, we develop a trade-imbalance based trading strategy 
conditional on informed trading and announcements with high dispersion of beliefs. 
Since the 30-year bonds are not frequently traded in the market, we develop the trading 
strategy only for the 2-year, 5-year and 10-year notes. Chordia and Subrahmanyam 
(2004) develop a trading strategy in stock market. They buy a share at the opening ask 
and sell at the closing bid if the trade imbalance is positive during the previous day. The 
trades are reversed if the previous day's imbalance was negative. They show that their 
trading strategy yields a statistically significant positive daily returns for the entire 
sample. This thesis develops a trading strategy that is similar to the one developed by 
Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004). We expect that our modified trading strategy will 
provide more significant results since we condition our trading on the dispersion of 
beliefs and aggressive (informed) trades. 19 
6.1 Trade-imbalance Based Trading Strategy Conditional on Dispersion of Beliefs 
This section presents the results from the trade-imbalance based trading strategy 
conditional on dispersion of beliefs. The returns are from a trading strategy that is based 
on low slope days (the days with order book slope of 10%, 15%,20%,25% or 30% lower 
than the average of previous 365 days). On those days with high dispersion of beliefs, if 
the trade imbalance is positive, we buy(sell) at the opening ask(bid) quote and sell(buy) 
at the closing bid(ask) quote in the following day. Return is calculated as the log changes 
of the first and last quotes of that day and it is reported in percentage points in the table. 
Table 27 reports the average returns over the period from June 1,2005 to May 30, 2008 
for the 2-year, 5-year and IO-year notes based on this trading strategy. t- Statistics are in 
parentheses. 
19 Chordia and Subrahmanyam(2004) condition their trades on the level of surprise in the macroeconomic 
announcements; however, surprise may not be a good measure of dispersion of beliefs as discussed in the 
text. 
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Panel A in Table 27 presents the average returns based on the trading strategy. In Panel 
A, trade imbalance is calculated with the aggregate trades without differentiating the 
informed trades from the liquidity trades. As it is shown in the table, such a strategy 
yields positive returns only for the 5-year notes when the previous day's order book slope 
is 15%,20%,25% or 30% lower than the average of last 365 days, though the returns are 
not significant. However, in Panel B, where trade imbalance is calculated by the informed 
trades only, the trading strategy yields more positive returns for all the indicated 
securities, but the positive return is only significant for 10-year notes when the previous 
day's order book slope is 20% lower than the average of the previous 365 days. For 
example, for the 10-year note, when we buy (sell) at the opening quote and sell (buy) at 
the closing quote if the previous day's trade imbalance is positive (negative) and order 
book slope is 20% lower than the average of previous 365 days, the strategy yields a 
significant daily average returns of 0.144%. Compared to Panel A, trading strategy in 
Panel B yields more positive returns, which, to some degree, demonstrates that 
aggressive trades are more informative on the future returns during the days with high 
dispersion of beliefs among investors. However, the results in this table are not 
significantly and positively different from zero. 
6.2 Trade-Imbalance Based Trading Strategy Conditional on Dispersion of Beliefs 
and Announcement Days 
This section shows the trade-imbalance based trading strategy conditional on dispersion 
of beliefs and macroeconomic announcement days. Different from section 6.1, we 
develop the trading strategy based on the days with macroeconomic announcements only 
instead of all days. 
Table 28 reports the average returns over the period from June 1, 2005 to May 30, 2008 
for the 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year notes. The returns are from the following trading 
strategy: we buy or sell (i) if the previous day is an announcement day, and (ii) if the 
order book slope on the previous announcement day is lower (10%, 15%,20% 25% or 
30% lower) than the average slope of previous 365 announcement and non-
announcement days. During those low slope announcement days, if the imbalance is 
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positive (negative), we buy (sell) at the opening ask (bid) quote and sell (buy) at the 
closing bid (ask) quote on the next day. Return is the log changes of the first and last 
quotes of that day and it is in percentage points. t- Statistics are in parentheses. 
Panel A in Table 28 presents the average returns based on the trading strategy conditional 
on dispersion of beliefs and announcement days. In this Panel, trade imbalance is 
calculated with the aggregate trades without differentiating the informed trades from the 
liquidity trades. As it is shown in the table, generally, such a strategy yields more 
negative returns. For the 2-year note, it yields significantly negative returns when the 
announcement days' order book slope is 10% and 15% lower than the average slope of 
the previous 365 days. 
Panel B in Table 28 reports the average returns based on the trading strategy conditional 
on aggressive (informed) trades, dispersion of beliefs and announcement days. In this 
Panel, trade imbalance is calculated with informed trades only. Compared to Panel A, 
trading strategy in Panel B yields more positive returns, which confirms the finding in the 
previous section that aggressive trades are more informative on the future returns during 
the days with high dispersion of beliefs among investors. The returns are significantly 
positive for the 2-year notes when the announcement days' order book slope is 25% or 
30% lower than the average slope of previous 365 days. For the 2-year and 5-year notes, 
we can see that the higher the degree of dispersion on announcement days is, the higher 
and more significantly positive the returns for the Treasury notes are. This finding 
implies that the dispersion of beliefs among investors is associated with the informed 
trading and return predictability of the trade imbalance. 
Fleming (1997) finds that the transaction cost is $39 per $1 million of bonds in the 
GovPX markets. However, Mizrach and Neely (2006) show that the transaction cost 
fallen by more than 90% to $2.5 per $1 million of bonds in the eSpeed markets. Based on 
our trading strategy, it yields daily average returns of 0.083% for the 2-year notes when 
the previous day is an announcement day and the order book slope is 30% lower than the 
average slope of the previous 365 days. Therefore, for $1 million of2-year note, the 
50 
strategy yields $830 profit ($1 million*0.083%). After subtracting the trading cost from 
the gross profit, we have the net profit of $827.5($830-$2.5). 
6.3 Trade-Imbalance Based Trading Strategy Based on the Method in Chordia and 
Subrahmanyam (2004) 
In this section, we follow the trading strategy of Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004), 
which find significant average daily returns in the stock market. The average return is 
calculated from a strategy that buys a share at the opening ask and sells at the closing bid 
if the trade imbalance is positive during the previous day. The trades are reversed if the 
previous day's imbalance was negative. 
Table 29 reports the average returns over the period from June 1, 2005 to May 30, 2008 
for the 2-year, 5-year and 10-year notes. The returns are from (i) the trading strategy that 
buys (sells) if the previous day's trade imbalance is positive (negative), or (ii) a trading 
strategy that buys (sells) if the trade imbalance is positive (negative) and large (more than 
one or two standard deviation from zero). If we buy (sell), we buy (sell) at the opening 
ask (bid) quote and sell (buy) at the closing bid (ask) quote. Return is the log changes of 
the first and last quotes of that day and it is in percentage points. t- Statistics are in 
parentheses. 
In Panel A, the trade imbalance is calculated by the aggregate trade. It is shown in the 
table that the strategy yields negative returns for the 2-year, 5-year and IO-year notes for 
all the indicated degrees of trade imbalance, and the negative returns are significant for 
the first strategy (TIB positive or negative) in the case of2-year notes. In Panel B, the 
trade imbalance is calculated by the aggressive (informed) trades only. Similar to Panel 
A, the average daily returns for the 2-year, 5-year and 10-year notes are all negative for 
all the indicated degrees of trade imbalance. The negative returns are significant for the 
first strategy (TIB positive or negative) in the case of 2-year and 5-year notes. This 
finding implies that the trading strategy in Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) may not 
be suitable for the Treasury market. Our trade-imbalance based trading strategy 
conditional on dispersion of beliefs and announcement days seems to provide higher 
returns in the U.S. Treasury market. 
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7. Conclusions 
In this thesis we investigate how informed trading, macroeconomic announcements and 
dispersion of beliefs affect the return predictability of trade imbalance using the eSpeed 
U.S. Treasury data for the period from June 2005 to May 2008 for the 2-year, 5-year, 10-
year notes and 30-year bonds. 
For preliminary analysis, this thesis provides statistics for the trading activities of the 
U.S. Treasury notes and bonds. The statistics show that trading volume, trading 
frequency, bid-ask spread and daily absolute number of trades increase, while trade size 
and quote size decrease before the macroeconomic release. To some degree, the 
descriptive statistics imply that there are more speculations and cautious trading during 
the announcement days with high dispersion of beliefs among investors. Moreover, we 
conduct a simple regression analysis and estimate the price impact coefficient for the 2-
year, 5-year, 10-year notes and 30-year bonds using eSpeed U.S. Treasury data. The 
results show that the price impact coefficient increases monotonically with maturity, 
which is smallest for the 2-year notes and largest for the 30-year bonds, indicating that 2-
year notes are the most liquid T-notes in the eSpeed U.S. Treasury market. Compared to 
Fleming (2003) that uses GovPX data, the price impact coefficient is much smaller in this 
thesis, implying that eSpeed electronic market is much more liquid than the interdealer 
market. 
Furthermore, this thesis differentiates liquidity trades from informed trades and estimates 
trade imbalance based on informed trades only. Motivated by Abad and Rubia(2004), 
which show that order aggressiveness is closely related to informed trading, we use the 
aggressive trades as a proxy for informed trades. In addition, in order to examine the 
effect of the dispersion of beliefs on the return predictability of trade imbalance, we use 
daily order book slope as a proxy for dispersion of beliefs. The regression results show 
that, on the macroeconomic announcement days with high dispersion of beliefs, daily 
trade imbalance estimated by aggressive (informed) trades positively and significantly 
predicts returns on the following day for the 2-year, 5-year and 10-year Treasury notes. 
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Chordia et al. (2002) and Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) find a positive relation 
between lagged daily imbalance and returns in stock market, but the sign reverses after 
controlling for the current imbalance due to inventory effects. However, this thesis show 
that on the macroeconomic announcement days with high dispersion of beliefs, daily 
trade imbalance estimated by informed trades still positively and significantly predicts 
returns, even after controlling for current trade imbalance. This result implies that 
aggressive trades and dispersion of beliefs among investors are associated with informed 
trading, which strengthen the return predictability of the trade imbalance. During the 
announcement days with high dispersion of beliefs, the announcements are not easy to 
interpret by all the investors. On those days, the traders with advanced trading skills can 
extract private information from the announcements and speculate in the Treasury 
market. Thus, during the period with high dispersion of beliefs, trade imbalance 
estimated by informed trades is more informative on the future returns. Moreover, 
findings in this thesis suggest that with short-lived information, informed traders are 
more likely to place aggressive orders. 
Finally, based on the regression results, this thesis develops a trade-imbalance based 
trading strategy conditional on dispersion of beliefs and announcement days, which 
yields positive returns for 2-year, 5-year and 10-year Treasury notes. The returns are 
significantly positive for the 2-year notes when the announcement day order book slope 
is 25% or 30% lower than the average slope of the previous 365 days. The returns are 
positive for the 5-year and 10-year notes when the daily order book slope is 10%, 15%, 
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Table 1 
Daily Trading Volumes of u.S. Treasury Securities 
The table reports descriptive statistics on daily trading volume for the indicated on-the-
run securities in millions of U.S. dollars for Tokyo, London and U.S. trading hours, for 
both announcement days and non-announcement days. Announcement days are defined 
as those with morning or afternoon announcements. Non-announcement days are those 
with no morning or afternoon announcements. There are 400 announcement days and 350 
non-announcement days. We report the p-values from the t-statistic and wilcoxon signed 
rank statistic to compare means and medians for announcement and non-announcement 
days. The sample period is June 1, 2005 to May 30, 2008. 
Announcement days N on-announcement days Mean Test Median 
P Value Test 
Issue Mean Median Mean Median P Value 
Panel A: 'J:'0kyo 
Two-year note 412 327 406 297 0.8243 0.2235 
Five-year note 299 267 285 237 0.3208 0.0913 
Ten-year note 377 337 371 328 0.7224 0.3391 
Thirty -year bond 25 19 24 19 0.5842 0.2601 
Panel B: London 
Two-year note 1701 1514 1537 1346' 0.0305* 0.0107* 
Five-year note 958 852 888 819 0.0499* 0.0463* 
Ten-year note 1000 900 933 854 0.0791 0.0398* 
Thirty-year bond 119 104 112 97 0.2188 0.1874 
Panel C: US 
Two-year note 26485 24929 22079 20124 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Five-year note 23669 22528 19985 18741 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Ten-year note 19479 19189 16399 15717 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Thirty-year bond 2923 2825 2517 2384 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
* and ** indicate significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 
Daily Trading Volumes of U.S. Treasury Securities (Days with top 30% surprise) 
The table reports descriptive statistics on daily trading volume for the indicated on-the-
run securities in millions of U.S. dollars for Tokyo, London and U.S. trading hours, for 
both announcement days and non-announcement days. Announcement days are defined 
as those with 8:30 am announcement and with the top 30% surprise. Non-announcement 
days are those with no morning or afternoon announcements. There are 100 8:30am 
announcement days with top 30% surprise and 350 non-announcement days. We report 
the p-values from the t-statistic and wilcoxon signed rank statistic to compare means and 
medians for announcement and non-announcement days. The sample period is June 1, 
2005 to May 30, 2008. 
Announcement days Non-announcement days Mean Test Median 
P Value Test 
Issue Mean Median Mean Median P Value 
Panel A: Tokyo 
Two-year note 378 305 406 297 0.4426 0.8637 
Five-year note 297 250 285 237 0.5634 0.3345 
Ten-year note 386 337 371 328 0.6032 0.5797 
Thirty-year bond 25 18 24 19 0.8284 0.7290 
Panel B: London 
Two-year note 1639 1467 1537 1346 0.4183 0.3924 
Five-year note 907 770 888 819 0.7637 0.9115 
Ten-year note 962 823 933 854 0.7251 0.7904 
Thirty-year bond 123 94 112 97 0.3483 0.7828 
Panel C: US 
Two-year note 27697 26915 22079 20124 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Five-year note 25084 24046 19985 18741 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Ten -year note 20943 20404 16399 15717 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Thirty -year bond 3168 3096 2517 2384 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
* and ** indicate significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Daily Trading Volumes of U.S. Treasury Securities (Days with bottom 25% slope) 
The table reports descriptive statistics on daily trading volume for the indicated on-the-
run securities in millions of u.s. dollars for Tokyo, London and U.S. trading hours, for 
both announcement days and non-announcement days. Announcement days are defined 
as those with morning or afternoon announcements and with bottom 25% order book 
slope. Non-announcement days are those with no morning or afternoon announcements. 
There are 100 announcement days with bottom 25% order book slope and 350 non-
announcement days. We report the p-values from the t-statistic and wilcoxon signed rank 
statistic to compare means and medians for announcement and non-announcement days. 
The sample period is June 1, 2005 to May 30, 2008. 
Announcement days Non-announcement days Mean Test Median 
P Value Test 
Issue Mean Median Mean Median P Value 
Panel A: Tokyo 
Two-year note 580 485 406 297 0.0005** <.0001 ** 
Five-year note 401 373 285 237 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Ten-year note 368 337 371 328 0.8938 0.7578 
Thirty-year bond 25 19 24 19 0.6751 0.4070 
Panel B: London 
Two-year note 1970 1714 1537 1346 0.0002** <.0001 ** 
Five-year note 1118 1095 888 819 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Ten-year note 1002 919 933 854 0.2277 0.1518 
Thirty-year bond 114 91 112 97 0.8473 0.9316 
Panel C: US 
Two-year note 32336 31963 22079 20124 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Five-year note 27295 27075 19985 18741 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Ten-year note 19985 20124 16399 15717 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Thirty-year bond 2591 2391 2517 2384 0.5162 0.5168 
* and ** indicate significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Daily Trading Frequency of U.S. Treasury Securities 
The table reports descriptive statistics on the daily number of trades for the indicated on-
the-run securities for Tokyo, London and U.S. trading hours, for both announcement days 
and non-announcement days. Announcement days are defined as those with morning or 
afternoon announcements. Non-announcement days are those with no morning or 
afternoon announcements. There are 400 announcement days and 350 non-announcement 
days. We report the p-values from the t-statistic and wilcoxon signed rank statistic to 
compare means and medians for announcement and non-announcement days. The sample 
period is June 1,2005 to May 30,2008. 
Announcement days N on-announcement days Mean Test Median 
P Value Test 
Issue Mean Median Mean Median P Value 
Panel A: Tokyo 
Two-year note 39.7 28 38.5 28 0.6484 0.2338 
Five-year note 61.8 50 56.6 47 0.0818 0.0422* 
Ten-year note 83.9 75 80.2 74 0.3008 0.1442 
Thirty-year bond 13.6 12 13 10 0.4540 0.1474 
Panel B: London 
Two-year note 116.2 88 107.7 80 0.1504 0.0544 
Five-year note 158.5 130 146.5 124 0.0546 0.0451 * 
Ten-year note 179.9 156.5 169.9 154 0.1218 0.0879 
Thirty -year bond 56.2 51 54.2 50 0.3875 0.3227 
Panel C: US 
Two-year note 1026 757 879 628.5 0.0017** <.0001 ** 
Five-year note 1983.6 1651.5 1734.7 1425 0.0002** <.0001 ** 
Ten-year note 1843.2 1670.5 1614.8 1452 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Thirty -year bond 981.1 954.5 856.4 820 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
* and ** indicate significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Daily Trading Frequency of U.S. Treasury Securities (Days with top 30% surprise) 
The table reports descriptive statistics on the daily number of trades for the indicated on-
the-run securities for Tokyo, London and U.S. trading hours, for both announcement days 
and non-announcement days. Announcement days are defined as those with 8:30 am 
announcement and with the top 30% surprise. Non-announcement days are those with no 
morning or afternoon announcements. There are 100 8:30am announcement days with 
top 30% surprise and 350 non-announcement days. We report the p-values from the t-
statistic and wilcoxon signed rank statistic to compare means and medians for 
announcement and non-announcement days. The sample period is June 1, 2005 to May 
30,2008. 
Announcement days Non-announcement days Mean Test Median 
P Value Test 
Issue Mean Median Mean Median P Value 
. Panel A: Tokyo 
Two-year note 37.9 27 38.5 28 0.8641 0.4779 
Five-year note 64 52 56.6 47 0.1153 0.0782 
Ten-year note 87.7 78.5 80.2 74 0.1938 0.1160 
Thirty-year bond 13.6 12 13 10 0.6162 0.3590 
Panel B: London 
Two-year note 108.5 87.5 107.7 80 0.9273 0.5553 
Five-year note 150.1 121 146.5 124 0.7214 0.9548 
Ten-year note 175 145 169.9 154 0.6478 0.9909 
Thirty-year bond 55.5 48 54.2 50 0.7545 0.9508 
Panel C: US 
Two-year note 1087.3 816.5 879 628.5 0.0072** <.0001 ** 
Five-year note 2103.9 1696.5 1734.7 1425 0.0010** <.0001 ** 
Ten-year note 1964.1 1746.5 1614.8 1452 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Thirty -year bond 1050.2 1032.5 856.4 820 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
* and ** indicate significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Daily Trading Frequency of U.S. Treasury Securities (Days with bottom 250/0 slope) 
The table reports descriptive statistics on the daily number of trades for the indicated on-
the-run securities for Tokyo, London and U.S. trading hours, for both announcement days 
and non-announcement days. Announcement days are defined as those with morning or 
afternoon announcements and with bottom 25% order book slope. Non-announcement 
days are those with no morning or afternoon announcements. There are 100 
announcement days with bottom 25% order book slope and 350 non-announcement days. 
We report the p-values from the t-statistic and wilcoxon signed rank statistic to compare 
means and medians for announcement and non-announcement day. The sample period is 
June 1, 2005 to May 30, 2008. 
Announcement days Non-announcement days Mean Test Median 
P Value Test 
Issue Mean Median Mean Median P Value 
Panel A: Tokyo 
Two-year note 70.8 64 38.5 28 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Five-year note 97.7 92 56.6 47 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Ten-year note 107.2 101.5 80.2 74 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Thirty-year bond 15.1 13 13 10 0.0961 0.0496* 
Panel B: London 
Two-year note 208 207 107.7 80 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Five-year note 235.7 236.5 146.5 124 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Ten-year note 236.5 235 169.9 154 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Thirty -year bond 59.8 49 54.2 50 0.1540 0.1675 
Panel C: US 
Two-year note 1857.3 1862 879 628.5 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Five-year note 3070 3173 1734.7 1425 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Ten-year note 2554.9 2586.5 1614.8 1452 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Thirty-year bond 1067.9 1032.5 856.4 820 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
* and ** indicate significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Trade Sizes of U.S. Treasury Securities 
The table reports descriptive statistics on mean daily trade sizes for the indicated on-the-
run securities in millions of U.S. dollars for Tokyo, London and U.S. trading hours, for 
both announcement days and non-announcement days. There are 400 announcement days 
and 350 non-announcement days. Announcement days are defined as those with morning 
or afternoon announcements. N on-announcement days are those with no morning or 
afternoon announcements. We report the p-values from the t-statistic and wilcoxon 
signed rank statistic to compare means and medians for announcement and non-
announcement days. The sample period is June 1, 2005 to May 30, 2008. 
Announcement days Non-announcement days Mean Test Median 
P Value Test 
Issue Mean Median Mean Median P Value 
Panel A: Tokyo 
Two-year note 11.1 10.5 11 10 0.8686 0.8904 
Five-year note 5 4.8 5.1 4.9 0.4158 0.5538 
Ten-year note 4.6 4.5 4.7 4.6 0.4046 0.4446 
Thirty-year bond 1.8 1.7 1.9 1.7 0.2885 0.8046 
Panel B: London 
Two-year note ') 16.5 15.3 15.8 14.5 0.1547 0.1538 
Five-year note 6.3 6.1 6.3 6.1 0.9783 0.8889 
Ten-year note 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.7 0.3427 0.5452 
Thirty -year bond 2 2 2 2 0.4526 0.7143 
Panel C: US 
Two-year note 29.4 29.6 28.8 28.8 0.3863 0.2864 
Five-year note 12.8 12.7 12.3 12.2 0.0225* 0.0217* 
Ten-year note 11.2 11.7 10.7 10.9 0.0053** 0.0004** 
Thirty -year bond 3 3 2.9 2.9 0.2834 0.2143 
* and ** indicate significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Trade Sizes of U.S. Treasury Securities (Days with top 30% surprise) 
The table reports descriptive statistics on mean daily trade sizes for the indicated on-the-
run securities in millions of U.S. dollars for Tokyo, London and U.S. trading hours, for 
both announcement days and non-announcement days. Announcement days are defined 
as those with 8:30 am announcement and with the top 30% surprise. Non-announcement 
days are those with no morning or afternoon announcements. There are 100 8:30am 
announcement days with top 30% surprise and 350 non-announcement days. We report 
the p-values from the t-statistic and wilcoxon signed rank statistic to compare means and 
medians for announcement and non-announcements. The sample period is June 1, 2005 
to May 30, 2008. 
Announcement days Non-announcement days Mean Test Median 
P Value Test 
Issue Mean Median Mean Median P Value 
Panel A: Tokyo 
Two-year note 10.5 9.8 11.0 10.0 0.2991 0.3945 
Five-year note 4.7 4.6 5.1 4.9 0.0449* 0.0568 
Ten-year note 4.4 4.3 4.7 4.6 0.0570 0.0327* 
Thirty-year bond 1.8 1.6 1.9 1.7 0.1269 0.4693 
Panel B: London 
Two-year note 16.7 14.5 15.8 14.5 0.2905 0.4695 
Five-year note 6.2 6.1 6.3 6.1 0.5675 0.6396 
Ten-year note 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 0.7819 0.5214 
Thirty -year bond 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.4473 0.6277 
Panel C: US 
Two-year note 28.8 28.9 28.8 28.8 0.9702 0.9004 
Five-year note 12.8 12.8 12.3 12.2 0.2180 0.1815 
Ten-year note 11.3 11.6 10.7 10.9 0.0584 0.0173* 
Thirty-year bond 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.9 0.4409 0.3545 
* and ** indicate significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 
Trade Sizes of U.S. Treasury Securities (Days with bottom 25% slope) 
The table reports descriptive statistics on mean daily trade sizes for the indicated on-the-
run securities in millions of U.S. dollars for Tokyo, London and U.S. trading hours, for 
both announcement days and non-announcement days. Announcement days are defined 
as those with morning or afternoon announcements and with bottom 25% order book 
slope. Non-announcement days are those with no morning or afternoon announcements. 
There are 100 announcement days with bottom 25% order book slope and 350 non-
announcement days. We report the p-values from the t-statistic and wilcoxon signed rank 
statistic to compare means and medians for announcement and non-announcement day. 
The sample period is June 1, 2005 to May 30, 2008. 
Announcement days Non-announcement days Mean Test Median 
P Value Test 
Issue Mean Median Mean Median P Value 
Panel A: Tokyo 
Two-year note 7.9 7.5 11 10 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Five-year note 4.2 3.8 5.1 4.9 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Ten-year note 3.4 3.3 4.7 4.6 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Thirty-year bond 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.7 0.0020** 0.0235* 
Panel B: London 
Two-year note 9.6 9 15.8 14.5 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Five-year note 4.8 4.5 6.3 6.1 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Ten-year note 4.3 3.9 5.6 5.7 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Thirty-year bond 1.8 1.7 2 2 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Panel C: US 
Two-year note 18.3 17.1 28.8 28.8 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Five-year note 9.3 8.8 12.3 12.2 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Ten-year note 8.3 7.5 10.7 10.9 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Thirty -year bond 2.4 2.3 2.9 2.9 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
* and ** indicate significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 10 
Quote Sizes of U.S. Treasury Securities 
The table reports descriptive statistics on mean daily quotes sizes for the indicated on-the 
-run securities in millions of U.S. dollars for Tokyo, London and U.S. trading hours, for 
both announcement days and non-announcement days. Quotes sizes are the quantity of 
securities bid for or offered for sale at the best bid and offer prices in the electronic 
market, the mean daily figure is calculated with both bid and offer quantities. 
Announcement days are defined as those with morning or afternoon announcements. 
Non-announcement days are those with no morning or afternoon announcements. There 
are 400 announcement days and 350 non-announcement days. We report the p-values 
from the t-statistic and wilcoxon signed rank statistic to compare means and medians for 
announcement and non-announcement days. The sample period is June 1, 2005 to May 
30,2008. 
Announcement days Non-announcement days Mean Test Median 
P Value Test 
Issue Mean Median Mean Median P Value 
Panel A: Tokyo 
Two-year note 46.2 32.9 45.7 34.9 0.8267 0.7083 
Five-year note 13 11.8 12.9 11.8 0.8476 0.9844 
Ten-year note 13.9 13.1 14.1 13.1 0.7914 0.9001 
Thirty-year bond 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.4 0.1121 0.2932 
Panel B: London 
Two-year note 105.6 82.9 105.2 80.1 0.9481 0.7933 
Five-year note 23.2 19.9 23.3 20.3 0.9223 0.8865 
Ten-year note 22.3 21.3 22.2 21.2 0.8871 0.9009 
Thirty-year bond 3.5 3.2 3.6 3.3 0.7444 0.5666 
Panel C: US 
Two-year note 267.3 260.6 279.4 264.7 0.2766 0.2966 
Five-year note 54 53.4 56.4 56.7 0.1524 0.1357 
Ten-year note 52.7 54 54.5 55 0.2234 0.2429 
Thirty -year bond 6 5.5 6.1 5.6 0.6997 0.4976 
* and ** indicate significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 11 
Quote Sizes of U.S. Treasury Securities (Days with top 30% surprise) 
The table reports descriptive statistics on mean daily electronic trading quotes sizes for 
the indicated on-the-run securities in millions of U.S. dollars for Tokyo, London and U.S. 
trading hours, for both announcement days and non-announcement days. Quotes sizes are 
the quantity of securities bid for or offered for sale at the best bid and offer prices in the 
electronic market; the mean daily figure is calculated with both bid and offer quantities. 
Announcement days are defined as those with 8:30 am announcement and with top 30% 
macroeconomic surprise. Non-announcement days are those with no morning or 
afternoon announcements. There are 100 8:30am announcement days with top 30% 
surprise and 350 non-announcement days. We report the p-values from the t-statistic and 
wilcoxon signed rank statistic to compare means and medians for announcement and non-
announcement days. The sample period is June 1,2005 to May 30, 2008. 
Announcement days N on-announcement days Mean Test Median 
P Value Test 
Issue Mean Median Mean Median P Value 
Panel A: Tokyo 
Two-year note 41.4 29.9 45.7 34.9 0.1973 0.2751 
Five-year note 12.4 11.2 12.9 11.8 0.5151 0.3902 
Ten-year note 13.3 12.6 14.1 13.1 0.3508 0.3518 
Thirty-year bond 2.6 2.2 2.5 2.4 0.7372 0.2697 
Panel B: London 
Two-year note 101.1 77.8 105.2 80.1 0.6438 0.6983 
Five-year note 21.4 18.2 23.3 20.3 0.1880 0.2094 
Ten-year note 21.3 19.3 22.2 21.2 0.4897 0.5831 
Thirty-year bond 3.4 3 3.6 3.3 0.4851 0.2267 
Panel C: US 
Two-year note 257.3 255.6 279.5 264.7 0.1796 0.2331 
Five-year note 52.1 52.8 56.4 56.7 0.0800 0.1152 
Ten-year note 50.4 53.2 54.5 55 0.0595 0.1208 
Thirty-year bond 5.8 5.4 6.1 5.6 0.3370 0.3840 
* and ** indicate significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 12 
Quote Sizes of U.S. Treasury Securities (Days with bottom 250/0 slope) 
The table reports descriptive statistics on mean daily electronic trading quotes sizes for 
the indicated on-the-run securities in millions of U.S. dollars for Tokyo, London and U.S. 
trading hours, for both announcement days and non-announcement days. Quotes sizes are 
the quantity of securities bid for or offered for sale at the best bid and offer prices in the 
electronic market; the mean daily figure is calculated with both bid and offer quantities. 
Announcement days are defined as those with morning or afternoon announcements and 
with bottom 25% order book slope. Non-announcement days are those with no morning 
or afternoon announcements. There are 100 announcement days with bottom 25% order 
book slope and 350 non-announcement days. We report the p-values from the t-statistic 
and wilcoxon signed rank statistic to compare means and medians for announcement and 
non-announcement days. The sample period is June 1, 2005 to May 30, 2008. 
Announcement days Non-announcement days Mean Test Median 
P Value Test 
Issue Mean Median Mean Median P Value 
Panel A: Tokyo 
Two-year note 20 18.1 45.7 34.9 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Five-year note 7.2 6.7 12.9 11.8 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Ten-year note 7.4 6 14.1 13.1 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Thirty-year bond 2.1 1.9 2.5 2.4 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Panel B: London 
Two-year note 34.2 33.6 105.2 80.1 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Five-year note 10.8 8.3 23.3 20.3 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Ten-year note 10.5 8.5 22.2 21.2 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Thirty-year bond 2.4 2 3.6 3.3 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Panel C: US 
Two-year note 85.7 75.7 279.5 264.7 <.0001 ** <.0001** 
Five-year note 28.3 24.5 56.4 56.7 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Ten-year note 30.1 27.1 54.5 55 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Thirty-year bond 3.8 3.3 6.1 5.6 <.0001 ** <.0001** 
* and ** indicate significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 13 
Daily Absolute Net Numbers of Trades of U.S. Treasury Securities 
The table reports descriptive statistics on daily absolute net number of trades for the 
indicated on-the-run securities for Tokyo, London and U.S. trading hours, for both 
announcement days and non-announcement days. The daily absolute net number of trades 
equals the absolute value of daily net number of trade (the buyer initiated trades minus 
the seller initiated trades). Announcement days are defined as those with morning or 
afternoon announcements. Non-announcement days are those with no morning or 
afternoon announcements. There are 400 announcement days and 350 non-announcement 
days. We report the p-values from the t-statistic and wilcoxon signed rank statistic to 
compare means and medians for announcement and non-announcement day. The sample 
period is June 1, 2005 to May 30, 2008. 
Announcement days Non-announcement days Mean Median 
Test Test 
Issue Mean Median Mean Median P Value P Value 
Panel A: Tokyo 
Two-year note 7.1 5 7.6 5 0.4400 0.4387 
Five-year note 10.1 8 9.2 7 0.1772 0.0476* 
Ten-year note 10.5 8 10.7 9 0.8595 0.3819 
Thirty-year bond 3.8 3 4.1 3 0.2971 0.5562 
Panel B: London 
Two-year note 10.4 8 11.1 8 0.3830 0.9241 
Five-year note 14 11 13.6 11 0.5791 0.5387 
Ten-year note 14.6 13 14.6 11 0.9805 0.4908 
Thirty-year bond 7.3 5 7 5 0.4358 0.3059 
Panel C: US 
Two-year note 45.9 37 43.6 34 0.4128 0.3986 
Five-year note 88.9 76.5 80.5 65.5 0.0852 0.1406 
Ten-year note 61.5 52 57.5 47.5 0.2424 0.1741 
Thirty-year bond 34.3 27 35.2 27.5 0.6580 0.7467 
* and ** indicate significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 14 
Daily Absolute Net Numbers of Trades of U.S. Treasury Securities 
(Days with top 30% surprise) 
The table reports descriptive statistics on daily absolute net number of trades for the 
indicated on-the-mn securities for Tokyo, London and U.S. trading hours, for both 
announcement days and non-announcement days. The daily absolute net number of trades 
equals the absolute value of daily net number of trade (the buyer initiated trades minus 
the seller initiated trades). Announcement days are defined as those with 8:30 am 
announcement and with top 30% macroeconomic surprise. Non-announcement days are 
those with no morning or afternoon announcements. There are 100 8:30am 
announcement days with top 30% surprise and 350 non-announcement days. We report 
the p-values from the t-statistic and wilcoxon signed rank statistic to compare means and 
medians for announcement and non-announcement days. The sample period is June 1, 
2005 to May 30, 2008. 
Announcement days Non-announcement days Mean Median 
Test Test 
Issue Mean Median Mean Median P Value P Value 
Panel A: Tokyo 
Two-year note 6.4 5.0 7.6 5.0 0.1115 0.4387 
Five-year note 9.5 7.0 9.2 7.0 0.7423 0.0476* 
Ten-year note 11.1 7.0 10.7 9.0 0.7468 0.3819 
Thirty-year bond 3.5 2.0 4.1 3.0 0.1403 0.5562 
Panel B: London 
Two-year note 9.8 7.0 11.1 8.0 0.2915 0.9241 
Five-year note 12.5 9.5 13.6 11.0 0.4019 0.5387 
Ten-year note 14.1 13.0 14.6 11.0 0.6471 0.4908 
Thirty-year bond 8.0 6.0 7.0 5.0 0.2643 0.3059 
Panel C: US 
Two-year note 41.9 32.0 43.6 34.0 0.6458 0.3986 
Five-year note 92.0 83.5 80.5 65.5 0.1158 0.1406 
Ten-year note 57.6 45.5 57.5 47.5 0.9787 0.1741 
Thirty -year bond 34.1 25.5 35.2 27.5 0.7206 0.7467 
* and ** indicate significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
71 
Table 15 
Daily Absolute Net Numbers of Trades of U.S. Treasury Securities 
(Days with bottom 25% slope) 
The table reports descriptive statistics on daily absolute net number of trades for the 
indicated on-the-run securities for Tokyo, London and U.S. trading hours, for both 
announcement days and non-announcement days. The daily absolute net number of trades 
equals the absolute value of daily net number of trade (the buyer initiated trades minus 
the seller initiated trades). Announcement days are defined as those with morning or 
afternoon announcements and with bottom 25% order book slope. Non-announcement 
days are those with no morning or afternoon announcements. There are 100 
announcement days with bottom 25% order book slope and 350 non-announcement days. 
We report the p-values from the t-statistic and wilcoxon signed rank statistic to compare 
means and medians for announcement and non-announcement days. The sample period is 
June 1,2005 to May 30,2008. 
Announcement days Non-announcement days Mean Test Median 
P Value Test 
Issue Mean Median Mean Median P Value 
Panel A: Tokyo 
Two-year note 9.5 7 7.6 5 0.0445* 0.0666 
Five-year note 14.5 12 9.2 7 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Ten-year note 13 10 10.7 9 0.0618 0.1213 
Thirty-year bond 4.1 3 4.1 3 0.8831 0.9345 
Panel B: London 
Two-year note 14.2 10 11.1 8 0.0211 * 0.0084** 
Five-year note 15.4 13 13.6 11 0.1863 0.1569 
Ten-year note 14.5 13 14.6 11 0.9420 0.6625 
Thirty-year bond 8.4 7 7 5 0.0748 0.0254* 
Panel C: US 
Two-year note 57.1 46.5 43.6 34 0.0046** 0.0028** 
Five-year note 103.4 87.5 80.5 65.5 0.0104* 0.0057** 
Ten-year note 64.4 50 57.5 47.5 0.2610 0.4695 
Thirty-year bond 37.1 32 35.2 27.5 0.5814 0.4010 
* and ** indicate significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 16 
Bid-Ask Spreads of U.S. Treasury Securities 
The table reports descriptive statistics on mean daily bid-ask spread for the indicated on-
the-run securities in millions of U.S. dollars for Tokyo, London and U.S. trading hours, 
for both announcement days and non-announcement days. Announcement days are 
defined as those with morning or afternoon announcements. Non-announcement days are 
those with no morning or afternoon announcements. There are 400 announcement days 
and 350 non-announcement days. We report the p-values from the t-statistic and 
wilcoxon signed rank statistic to compare means and medians for announcement and non-
announcement days. The sample period is June 1, 2005 to May 30, 2008. 
Announcement days Non-announcement days Mean Median 
Test Test 
Issue Mean Median Mean Median P Value P Value 
Panel A: Tokyo 
Two-year note 0.01329 0.01263 0.01489 0.01254 0.0895 0.4976 
Five-year note 0.01724 0.01588 0.01954 0.01603 0.0855 0.5738 
Ten-year note 0.02696 0.02506 0.03021 0.02521 0.0846 0.4340 
Thirty-year bond 0.11182 0.08079 0.11953 0.08425 0.2283 0.2456 
Panel B: London 
Two-year note 0.00962 0.00939 0.0099 0.00939 0.1321 0.6276 
Five-year note 0.01186 0.01092 0.01238 0.01102 0.1209 0.4845 
Ten-year note 0.02179 0.02072 0.02268 0.02068 0.1526 0.9788 
Thirty-year bond 0.05863 0.03937 0.06318 0.03846 0.3749 0.8932 
Panel C: US 
Two-year note 0.00829 0.00819 0.00826 0.00816 0.2150 0.0704 
Five-year note 0.00921 0.00893 0.00915 0.0089 0.2671 0.2170 
Ten-year note 0.01762 0.0173 0.01756 0.01726 0.4021 0.2367 
Thirty-year bond 0.03131 0.02851 0.03057 0.02803 0.1996 0.0129* 
* and ** indicate significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 17 
Bid-Ask Spreads of U.S. Treasury Securities (Days with top 30% surprise) 
The table reports descriptive statistics on mean daily bid-ask spread for the indicated on-
the-run securities in millions of U.S. dollars for Tokyo, London and U.S. trading hours, 
for both announcement days and non-announcement days. Announcement days are 
defined as those with 8:30 am announcement and with top 30% macroeconomic surprise. 
Non announcement days are those with no morning or afternoon announcements. There 
are 100 8:30am announcement days with top 30% surprise and 350 non-announcement 
days. We report the p-values from the t-statistic and wilcoxon signed rank statistic to 
compare means and medians for announcement and non-announcement days. The sample 
period is June 1, 2005 to May 30, 2008. 
Announcement days Non-announcement days Mean Test Median 
P Value Test 
Issue Mean Median Mean Median P Value 
Panel A: Tokyo 
Two-year note 0.01352 0.01276 0.01489 0.01254 0.2007 0.7428 
Five-year note 0.01684 0.01587 0.01954 0.01603 0.0413* 0.5738 
Ten-year note 0.02698 0.02565 0.03021 0.02521 0.0917 0.6109 
Thirty -year bond 0.11653 0.08115 0.11953 0.08425 0.7677 0.5169 
Panel B: London 
Two-year note 0.00967 0.00953 0.0099 0.00939 0.2640 0.8176 
Five-year note 0.01202 0.01111 0.01238 0.01102 0.3928 0.4845 
Ten-year note 0.02195 0.02086 0.02268 0.02068 0.3036 0.6810 
Thirty-year bond 0.06352 0.04001 0.06318 0.03846 0.9631 0.7759 
Panel C: US 
Two-year note 0.00831 0.00820 0.00826 0.00816 0.1917 0.0723 
Five-year note 0.00925 0.00899 0.00915 0.00890 0.2162 0.2170 
Ten-year note 0.01766 0.01734 0.01756 0.01726 0.3871 0.3561 
Thirty-year bond 0.03179 0.02902 0.03057 0.02803 0.1822 0.0236* 
* and ** indicate significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 18 
Bid-Ask Spreads of U.S. Treasury Securities (Days with bottom 250/0 slope) 
The table reports descriptive statistics on mean daily bid-ask spread for the indicated on-
the-mn securities in millions of U.S. dollars for Tokyo, London and U.S. trading hours, 
for both announcement days and non-announcement days. Announcement days are 
defined as those with morning or afternoon announcements and with bottom 25% order 
book slope. Non-announcement days are those with no morning or afternoon 
announcements. There are 100 8:30am announcement days with bottom 25% order book 
slope and 350 non-announcement days. We report the p-values from the t-statistic and 
wilcoxon signed rank statistic to compare means and medians for announcement and non-
announcement days. The sample period is June 1, 2005 to May 30, 2008. 
Announcement days Non-announcement days Mean Test Median 
P Value Test 
Issue Mean Median Mean Median P Value 
Panel A: Tokyo 
Two-year note 0.0159 0.01447 0.01489 0.01254 0.3425 <.0001 ** 
Five-year note 0.02149 0.01869 0.01954 0.01603 0.2924 <.0001 ** 
Ten-year note 0.03391 0.03077 0.03021 0.02521 0.1144 <.0001 ** 
Thirty-year bond 0.18605 0.15677 0.11953 0.08425 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Panel B: London 
Two-year note 0.01073 0.01037 0.0099 0.00939 0.0002** <.0001 ** 
Five-year note 0.01483 0.01371 0.01238 0.01102 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Ten-year note 0.02575 0.02465 0.02268 0.02068 0.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Thirty-year bond 0.10439 0.06632 0.06318 0.03846 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Panel C: US 
Two-year note 0.00868 0.00865 0.00826 0.00816 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Five-year note 0.01012 0.01011 0.00915 0.00890 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Ten-year note 0.01873 0.0187 0.01756 0.01726 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
Thirty-year bond 0.04011 0.0390 0.03057 0.02803 <.0001 ** <.0001 ** 
* and ** indicate significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 19 
Bid-Ask Spread by One-Minute Interval 
The reported bid-ask spread is the actual mean proportional spread timesl04. Announcement days are defined as those with 8:30 am 
announcement. Non announcement days are those with no morning or afternoon announcements. We report the p-values from the t-
statistic to compare means for announcement and non-announcement days assuming unequal variance. All one-minute intervals 
between 8:25 am and 8:40 am are examined. The period of analysis is June 1,2005 to May 30,2008. 
8:25- 8:26- 8:27- 8:28- 8:29- 8:30- 8:31- 8:32- 8:33- 8:34- 8:35- 8:36-
8:26 8:27 8:28 8:29 8:30 8:31 8:32 8:33 8:34 8:35 8:36 8:37 
Panel A: Two-year notes 
Ann days 0.8486 0.8638 0.8762 0.9026 1.6277 1.1861 0.8500 0.8384 0.8204 0.8321 0.8258 0.8267 
Non-Ann days 0.8347 0.8275 0.8216 0.8364 0.8654 0.8479 0.8256 0.8243 0.8162 0.8185 0.8088 0.8177 
Difference in Means 0.0139 0.0363** 0.0547** 0.0661 ** 0.7623** 0.3382** 0.0244** 0.0141 * 0.0042 0.0135 0.0170** 0.0090 
t-statistic p-value 0.1536 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0014 0.0377 0.4533 0.0534 0.0032 0.1751 
Panel B: Five-year notes 
Ann days 0.9409 0.9723 0.9893 1.1222 2.7939 1.7880 0.9333 0.9217 0.9114 0.9057 0.9068 0.8870 
Non-Ann days 0.9402 0.9434 0.9308 0.9364 1.0003 0.9643 0.9293 0.9207 0.9017 0.9155 0.8967 0.9045 
Difference in Means 0.0007 0.0289* 0.0585** 0.1858** 1.7935** 0.8237** 0.0039 0.0010 0.0097 -0.0098 0.0101 -0.0174 
t-statistic p-value 0.9630 0.0459 0.0006 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.7542 0.9308 0.3442 0.3481 0.3386 0.0843 
Panel C: Ten-year notes 
Ann days 1.7800 1.8109 1.8520 1.9674 3.9203 2.8242 1.7690 1.7689 1.7562 1.7296 1.7549 1.7278 
Non-Ann days 1.7725 1.7914 1.7960 1.8146 1.8954 1.8413 1.7800 1.7799 1.7602 1.8092 1.7652 1.7689 
Difference in Means 0.0074 0.0195 0.0560* 0.1528** 2.0249** 0.9828** -0.0111 -0.0110 -0.0039 -0.0796** -0.0103 -0.0411 * 
t-statistic p-value 0.7342 0.4151 0.0286 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.5634 0.5868 0.8418 <.0001 0.5944 0.0346 
Panel D: Thirty-year bond 
Ann days 3.3287 3.3977 4.0617 5.3129 12.0114 10.0303 3.9652 3.1537 3.0496 3.0146 2.9894 2.9420 
Non-Ann days 2.8885 2.9684 3.0379 3.0532 3.6762 3.3704 2.9695 2.8610 2.8603 2.8949 2.9330 2.8867 
Difference in Means 0.4402** 0.4293** 1.0239** 2.2597** 8.3352** 6.6599** 0.9957** 0.2927** 0.1893** 0.1198 0.0564 0.0553 
t-statistic p-value 0.0012 <.0001 0.0022 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0046 0.0004 0.0082 0.0737 0.4530 0.4069 
* and ** indicate significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Ann days and Non-Ann days represent announcement days and Non-announcement days, respectively. 
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Table 20 
Bid-Ask Spread by One-Minute Interval (Days with top 300/0 surprise) 
The reported bid-ask spread is the actual mean proportional spread timesl04. Announcement days are defined as those with 8:30 am 
announcement and with top 30% macroeconomic surprise. Non announcement days are those with no morning or afternoon 
announcements. We report the p-values from the t-statistic to compare means for announcement and non-announcement days 
assuming unequal variance. All one-minute intervals between 8:25 am and 8:40 am are examined. The period of analysis is June 1, 
2005 to May 30, 2008. 
8:25- 8:26- 8:27- 8:28- 8:29- 8:30- 8:31- 8:32- 8:33- 8:34- 8:35- 8:36-
8:26 8:27 8:28 8:29 8:30 8:31 8:32 8:33 8:34 8:35 8:36 8:37 
Panel A: Two-year notes 
Ann days 0.8594 0.8530 0.8811 0.9252 2.0658 1.2858 0.8502 0.8392 0.8348 0.8395 0.8342 0.8287 
Non-Ann days 0.8347 0.8275 0.8216 0.8364 0.8654 0.8479 0.8256 0.8243 0.8162 0.8185 0.8088 0.8177 
Difference in Means 0.0247 0.0256 0.0595** 0.0888** 1.2004** 0.4380** 0.0246* 0.0150 0.0186* 0.0209 0.0255** 0.0110 
t-statistic p-value 0.1178 0.0586 0.0012 0.0043 0.0006 <.0001 0.0150 0.0934 0.0264 0.0540 0.0050 0.2254 
Panel B: Five-year notes 
Ann days 0.9292 0.9557 1.0247 1.2086 3.5697 2.1728 0.9393 0.9245 0.9065 0.8997 0.9051 0.8941 
Non-Ann days 0.9402 0.9434 0.9308 0.9364 1.0003 0.9643 0.9293 0.9207 0.9017 0.9155 0.8967 0.9045 
Difference in Means -0.0110 0.0123 0.0940** 0.2722** 2.5693** 1.2085** 0.0100 0.0038 0.0047 -0.0158 0.0084 -0.0104 
t-statistic p-va1ue 0.5780 0.4963 0.0047 0.0055 <.0001 <.0001 0.6192 0.7969 0.7304 0.2571 0.5549 0.4595 
Panel C: Ten-year notes 
Ann days 1.7654 1.7771 1.8015 2.0683 4.9879 3.2995 1.7685 1.7732 1.7537 1.7306 1.7386 1.7194 
Non-Ann days 1.7725 1.7914 1.7960 1.8146 1.8954 1.8413 1.7800 1.7799 1.7602 1.8092 1.7652 1.7689 
Difference in Means -0.0071 -0.0144 0.0055 0.2537** 3.0925** 1.4582** -0.0115 -0.0067 -0.0065 -0.0786** -0.0267 -0.0495* 
t-statistic p-va1ue 0.8067 0.6528 0.8776 0.0033 <.0001 <.0001 0.6335 0.8016 0.8141 0.0022 0.2744 0.0349 
Panel D: Thirty-year bond 
Ann days 3.6304 3.6005 4.7261 6.4468 14.1353 13.1883 4.8666 3.2599 3.0728 3.0220 3.0556 2.9757 
Non-Ann days 2.8885 2.9684 3.0379 3.0532 3.6762 3.3704 2.9695 2.8610 2.8603 2.8949 2.9330 2.8867 
Difference in Means 0.7419* 0.6321 ** 1.6883 3.3936** 10.4592** 9.8179** 1.8971* 0.3990* 0.2125 0.1271 0.1226 0.0890 
t-statistic p-value 0.0196 <.0001 0.0577 0.0040 <.0001 <.0001 0.0434 0.0136 0.0611 0.2055 0.3484 0.3392 
* and ** indicate significant at the 0.05 and 0.011evels, respectively. 
Ann days and Non-Ann days represent announcement days and Non-announcement days, respectively. 
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Table 21 
Bid-Ask Spread by One-Minute Interval (Days with bottom 25% slope) 
The reported bid-ask spread is the actual mean proportional spread timesl04. Announcement days are defined as those with 8:30 am 
announcement and with the bottom 25% order book slope. Non announcement days are those with no morning or afternoon 
announcements. We report the p-values from the t-statistic to compare means for announcement and non announcement days 
assuming unequal variance. All one-minute intervals between 8:25 am and 8:40 am are examined. The period of analysis is June 1, 
2005 to May 30, 2008. 
8:25- 8:26- 8:27- 8:28- 8:29- 8:30- 8:31- 8:32- 8:33- 8:34- 8:35- 8:36-
8:26 8:27 8:28 8:29 8:30 8:31 8:32 8:33 8:34 8:34 8:36 8:37 
Panel A: Two-~ear notes 
Ann days 0.8927 0.9353 0.9331 0.9943 1.8511 1.2280 0.9007 0.8897 0.8577 0.8828 0.8637 0.8684 
Non-Ann days 0.8347 0.8275 0.8216 0.8364 0.8654 0.8479 0.8256 0.8243 0.8162 0.8185 0.8088 0.8177 
Difference in Means 0.0580** 0.1078** 0.1115** 0.1579** 0.9857** 0.3801 ** 0.0751 ** 0.0654** 0.0415** 0.0643** 0.0549** 0.0507** 
t-statistic p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Panel B: Five-year notes 
Ann days 1.0400 1.1182 1.1132 1.2662 3.8294 2.0949 1.0168 1.0058 1.0070 1.0095 0.9942 0.9740 
Non-Ann days 0.9402 0.9434 0.9308 0.9364 1.0003 0.9643 0.9293 0.9207 0.9017 0.9155 0.8967 0.9045 
Difference in Means 0.0998** 0.1748** 0.1824** 0.3298** 2.8291 ** 1.1306** 0.0875** 0.0851 ** 0.1053** 0.0940** 0.0975** 0.0695** 
t-statistic p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0007 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Panel C: Ten-year notes 
Ann days 1.9038 1.8864 1.9335 2.0949 4.7801 3.1256 1.8704 1.8357 1.8907 1.8375 1.8735 1.8228 
Non-Ann days 1.7725 1.7914 1.7960 1.8146 1.8954 1.8413 1.7800 1.7799 1.7602 1.8092 1.7652 1.7689 
Difference in Means 0.1313** 0.0950** 0.1375** 0.2803** 2.8847** 1.2843** 0.0904** 0.0558* 0.1305** 0.0283 0.1083** 0.0539* 
t-statistic p-value <.0001 0.0022 <.0001 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 0.0009 0.0317 <.0001 0.3201 0.0005 0.0492 
Panel D: Thirty-year bond 
Ann days 4.4209 4.1999 5.5826 7.1659 15.8808 9.4602 4.1933 4.1277 3.8969 3.7669 3.8552 3.7634 
Non-Ann days 2.8885 2.9684 3.0379 3.0532 3.6762 3.3704 2.9695 2.8610 2.8603 2.8949 2.9330 2.8867 
Difference in Means 1.5324** 1.2315** 2.5447** 4.1127** 12.2046** 6.0898** 1.2238** 1.2667** 1.0366** 0.8720** 0.9222** 0.8767** 
t-statistic p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.005 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
* and ** indicate significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Ann days and Non-Ann days represent announcement days and Non-announcement days, respectively. 
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Table 22 
Order Book Slope Statistics (1) 
This table presents summary statistics for the order book slope for 2-year, 5-year, 10-year 
notes and 30-year bonds for each half-hour trading frequency. The sample period is from 
June 1,2005 to May 30, 2008 during the U.S. trading hours. Slope is the limit order book 
slope based on 5 tiers quotes. Relative Slope is measured by the relative slope of demand 
side over supply side. The statistics is the actual statistic multiplied by 10-3 . Ann period 
is the period with macroeconomic announcements, while Non-Ann is the period without 
macroeconomic announcements. 
Panel A: Two-year note 
All sample Non-Ann period Ann period 
ask slope 25.04 24.97 27.07 
bid slope 25.23 25.16 26.91 
order book slope 25.14 25.07 26.99 
relative slope 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Panel B: Five-year note 
All sample Non-Ann period Ann period 
ask slope 17.60 17.56 18.72 
bid slope 17.68 17.64 18.65 
order book slope 17.64 17.60 18.69 
relative slope 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Panel C: Ten-year note 
All sample Non-Ann period Ann period 
ask slope 9.03 9.02 9.40 
bid slope 9.09 9.07 9.60 
order book slope 9.06 9.05 9.50 
relative slope 0.50 0.50 0.51 
Panel D: Thirty-year bond 
All sample Non-Ann period Ann period 
ask slope 3.88 3.87 4.09 
bid slope 3.89 3.88 4.04 
order book slope 3.89 3.88 4.06 
relative slope 0.50 0.50 0.50 
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Table 23 
Order Book Slope Statistics (2) 
This table presents summary statistics for the order book slope for 2-year, 5-year, 10-year 
notes and 30-year bonds for each half-hour trading frequency. The sample period is from 
May 31, 2007 to May 30, 2008 during the U.S. trading hours. Slope is the limit order 
book slope based on 5 tiers quotes. Relative Slope is measured by the relative slope of 
demand side over supply side. The statistics is the actual statistic multiplied by 10-3 • 
Low range Ann-periods are the periods of announcements in the bottom 20% forecast 
range. High range Ann-periods are the periods of announcements with top 20% forecast 
range. 
Panel A: Two-year note 
low range Ann-period high range Ann-period 
ask slope 23.32 22.75 
bid slope 22.49 21.62 
order book slope 22.90 22.l9 
relative slope 0.49 0.49 
Panel B: Five-year note 
low range Ann-period high range Ann-period 
ask slope 16.49 15.49 
bid slope 16.42 15.51 
order book slope 16.46 15.50 
relative slope 0.50 0.50 
Panel C: Ten-year note 
low range Ann-period high range Ann-period 
ask slope 8.08 7.92 
bid slope 8.37 8.34 
order book slope 8.23 8.l3 
relative slope 0.51 0.51 
Panel D: Thirty .. year bond 
low range Ann-period high range Ann-period 
ask slope 3.63 3.31 
bid slope 3.41 3.14 
order book slope 3.52 3.23 
relative slope 0.49 0.49 
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Table 24 
Price Impact by Different Definitions of Trade Imbalance 
The results are for 2-year, 5-year, 10-year notes and 3D-year bonds for the period from 
June 1, 2005 to May 30, 2008 during the U.S. trading hours. The model examines the 
relationship between trade imbalance (TIB) and price changes. TIB is defined in two 
different ways (TIBNUM and RELTIBNUM). TIBNUM is the number of buyer-initiated 
trades minus the number of seller-initiated trades. RELTIBNUM is the number of buyer-
initiated trades minus the number of seller-initiated trades, divides by the total number of 
trades. The model is defined as follows: 
!J.Pt = incercept + cpTIBt + Et 
2-year notes 5-year notes 10-year notes 30-year bonds 
Panel A: TIB is defined as TIBNUM 
intercept 0.000147(.000) 0.000786(.000) 0.000560(.000) 0.0006376(.005) 
cp 0.000973(.000) 0.001530(.000) O. 002560(.000) 0.005760(.000) 
iF 0.1159 0.1144 0.1293 0.0823 
Panel B: TIB is defined as RELTIBNUM 
intercept 0.000041(.267) 0.000337(.000) 0.000259(.032) 0.000274(.230) 
cp 0.003940(.000) 0.012050(.000) 0.019630(.000) 0.030150(.000) 
iF 0.039 0.0429 0.0508 0.0491 
81 
Table 25 
Daily Regression of Returns on Trade Imbalance, Order Book Imbalance and 
Lagged Trade Imbalance 
The results are for 2-year, 5-year, IO-year notes and 30-year bonds for the period from 
June 1, 2005 to May 30, 2008 during the U.S. trading hours (7:30 am to 5:30pm ET). 
The regression examines the relationship between daily return and daily trade imbalance, 
limit order book imbalance and lagged daily Trade Imbalance. TIB is the number of 
buyer-initiated trades minus the number of seller-initiated trades. TIBAI is the trade 
imbalance calculated by the Al trades with medium and lager size. OIB the order book 
imbalance calculated by 5 tiers of order book. Ann is the dummy variable, which equals 
to 1 when there morning or afternoon announcement, and equals to 0 otherwise. AD is 
the dummy variable, which equals to 1 when the slope is in the bottom 1/4, 1/5 or 1/6 on 
announcement days, and equals to 0 otherwise. 
Rt = /30 + /31TIBAlt+/32 DIBt + /33 * DIBt * Annt + /34 * TIBAl t * ADt 
+ /3sTIBAl t- 1 + /36 * TIBAl t- 1 * ADt- 1 + Et 
2-year notes 5-year notes 10-year notes 30-year bonds 
Panel A: AD is the dummy for bottom 1/4 slope announcement days 
/30 -0.00006318 -0.00002378 -0.00010013 -0.00009554 
(0.1049) (0.8013) (0.4591) (0.6944) 
/31 0.00005448 0.00003546 0.00012578 0.00020618 
(<.0001) «.0001) «.0001) «.0001) 
/32 1.221498E-7 9.542393E-7 0.00000144 0.00001423 
(0.0040) (0.0241) (0.0111) (0.0208) 
/33 8.85511E-8 2.498415E-7 9.835742E-7 -0.00001973 
(0.1235) (0.6458) (0.2366) (0.0185) 
/34 0.00000704 -0.00002656 -0.00002718 -0.00022767 
(0.6863) (0.0375) (0.2218) (0.0186) 
/35 -0.00003424 -0.00000551 -0.00001844 0.00005549 
(0.0024) (0.4910) (0.2070) (0.1421) 
/36 0.00005328 0.00003877 0.00004353 -0.00011294 
(0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0502) (0.2425) 
R2 0.1036 0.0592 0.1459 0.0415 
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Panel B: AD is the dummy for bottom 115 slope announcement days 
Po -0.00006394 -0.00002187 -0.00009914 0.00010129 (0.1008) (0.8168) (0.4631) (0.6780) 
Pi 0.00005353 0.00003727 0.00012573 0.00018817 (<.0001) «.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
P2 1.22373E-7 9.509352E-7 0.00000141 0.00001425 (0.0039) (0.0243) (0.0128) (0.0211) 
P3 8.84727E-8 2.311531E-7 0.00000101 -0.00002011 (0.1240) (0.6700) (0.2236) (0.0166) 
P4 0.00000952 -0.00003286 -0.00003305 -0.00016099 (0.5883) (0.0104) (0.1490) (0.1731) 
Ps -0.00003266 -0.00000467 -0.00001777 0.00004200 (0.0032) (0.5497) (0.1971) (0.2531) 
P6 0.00005216 0.00004078 0.00005061 -0.00002083 (0.0031) (0.0016) (0.0273) (0.8602) Jl2 0.1031 0.0635 0.1478 0.0352 
Panel C: AD is the dummy for bottom 116 slope announcement days 
Po -0.00006209 0.00002425 -0.00010230 -0.00010602 (0.1076) (0.7967) (0.4498) (0.6642) 
Pi 0.00005160 0.00003572 0.00011977 0.00017871 (<.0001) (<.0001) «.0001) (<.0001) 
P2 1.222841E-7 9.446675E-7 0.00000142 0.00001429 (0.0036) (0.0249) (0.0120) (0.0210) 
P3 8.915251E-8 2.391972E-7 0.00000100 -0.00002021 (0.1177) (0.6583) (0.2271) (0.0162) 
P4 0.00001134 -0.00003360 -0.00001792 -0.00007661 (0.5364) (0.0124) (0.4448) (0.5718) 
Ps -0.00003951 -0.00000595 -0.00001491 0.00003715 (0.0001) (0.4204) (0.2681) (0.3057) 
P6 0.00008697 0.00005239 0.00004796 0.00002289 (<.0001) (0.0001) (0.0411) (0.8661) 
R2 0.1196 0.0686 0.1450 0.0333 
83 
Table 26 
Predictability of Daily Returns by Using Lagged Trade Imbalance 
The results are for 2-year, 5-year, 10-year notes and 30-year bonds for the period from 
June 1, 2005 to May 30, 2008 during the U.S. trading hours (7:30 am to 5:30pm ET). 
The regression examines the relationship between daily return and lagged daily Trade 
Imbalance. TIB is the number of buyer-initiated trades minus the number of seller-
initiated trades. TIBAI is the trade imbalance calculated by the Al trades with medium 
and lager size. AD is the dummy variable, which equals to 1 when the slope is in the 
bottom 1/4, 1/5 or 1/6 on announcement days, and equals to 0 otherwise. 
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2-year notes 5-year notes 10-year notes 30-year bonds 
Panel A: AD is the dummy for bottom 114 slope announcement days 
Po -0.00001634 4.54E-07 -0.00007666 -0.00014965 (0.6904) (0.9967) (0.6175) (0.5675) 
P1 -0.00000169 6.81E-07 0.00000102 0.00000303 (0.0287) (0.5575) (0.6524) (0.6328) 
P2 -0.00002874 -0.00000846 -0.00002464 0.00004353 (0.0156) (0.3149) (0.1295) (0.2651) 
P3 0.00000213 -0.00000317 -0.00000631 0.00001711 (0.2277) (0.2022) (0.2269) (0.2753) 
P4 0.00004869 0.00005034 0.00004484 -0.00012005 (0.0103) (0.0005) (0.0718) (0.2245) 
k2 0.0138 0.0141 0.0002 0.0003 
Panel B: AD is the dummy for bottom 115 slope announcement days 
Po -0.00001655 -0.00000997 -0.00007595 -0.00015730 (0.6866) (0.9287) (0.6201) (0.5483) 
P1 -0.00000160 3.627848E-7 0.00000116 0.00000293 (0.0346) (0.7523) (0.6039) (0.6390) 
P2 -0.00002730 -0.00000740 -0.00002624 0.00002993 (0.0194) (0.3668) (0.0863) (0.4278) 
P3 0.00000214 -0.00000222 -0.00000806 0.00002379 (0.2660) (0.4170) (0.1435) (0.1637) 
P4 0.00004788 0.00005027 0.00005819 -0.00005911 (0.0128) (0.0008) (0.0234) (0.6242) 
k2 0.0130 0.0139 0.0031 -0.0003 
Panel C: AD is the dummy for bottom 116 slope announcement days 
Po -0.00001573 -0.00001488 -0.00008963 -0.00015644 (0.6980) (0.8932) (0.5598) (0.5508) 
P1 -0.00000175 3.312867E-7 -8.13108E-9 0.00000355 (0.0184) (0.7678) (0.9971) (0.5664) 
P2 -0.00003600 -0.00000691 -0.00002105 0.00002616 (0.0010) (0.3773) (0.1591) (0.4820) 
P3 0.00000317 -0.00000219 -6.92145E-7 0.00002278 (0.1105) (0.4740) (0.9082) (0.2190) 
P4 0.00008644 0.00005856 0.00004439 -0.00004119 (<.0001) (0.0002) (0.0916) (0.7671) 
k2 0.0355 0.0181 -0.0009 -0.0010 
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Table 27 
Profits from Trading Strategy Conditional on Dispersion of Beliefs 
This table reports the average returns over the period from June 1, 2005 to May 30, 2008 
for the 2-year, 5-year and 10-year notes. The returns are from a trading strategy that is 
based on low slope days (the days with an order book slope of 10%, 15%, 20%, 25% or 
30% lower than the average of previous 365 days). TIB is trade imbalance estimated by 
all trades, while TIB _FA 1 is trade imbalance estimated by the aggressive (informed) 
trades. On those days with high dispersion of beliefs, if the trade imbalance is positive, 
we buy at the opening ask quote and sell at the closing bid quote in the following day and 
vice versa. Return is calculated as the log changes of the first and last quotes of that day 
and it is reported in percentage points in the table. t- Statistic is in parentheses. 
2-year 5-year 10-year 
Panel A: TIB 
slope 10% lower than average -0.036% .. 0.0020/0 .. 0.034% 
(-3.21) (-0.09) (-0.81) 
slope 15% lower than average .. 0.0350/0 0.006% -0.049% 
(-2.78) (0.19) (-0.92) 
slope 20% lower than average -0.027% 0.012% -0.075% 
(-1.68) (0.29) (-1.08) 
slope 25% lower than average -0.0150/0 0.008% .. 0.1610/0 
(-0.65) (0.15) (-1.51) 
slope 30% lower than average .. 0.010% 0.021% -0.108% 
(-0.3) (0.27) (-0.69) 
Panel B: TIBA1 
slope 10% lower than average -0.016% -0.004% 0.029% 
(-1.4) (-0.15) (0.68) 
slope 15% lower than average -0.002% 0.010% 0.043% 
(-0.19) (0.32) (0.79) 
slope 20% lower than average 0.015% 0.001% 0.144% 
(0.92) (0.01) (2.08) 
slope 25% lower than average 0.033% .. 0.0010/0 0.062% 
(1.49) (-0.02) (0.56) 
slope 30% lower than average 0.0400/0 0.033% 0.154% 
(1.35) (0.44) (0.96) 
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Table 28 
Profits from Trading Strategy Conditional on Dispersion of Beliefs and 
Announcement Days 
This table reports the average returns over the period from June 1, 2005 to May 30, 2008 
for the 2-year, 5-year and 10-year notes. The returns are resulting from the trading 
strategy that we buy or sell (i) if the previous day is an announcement day, and (ii) if the 
order book slope on the previous announcement day is lower (10%, 15%, 20% 25% or 
30% lower) than the average slope of previous 365 announcement and non-
announcement days. TIB is trade imbalance estimated by all trades, while TIB_FAI is 
trade imbalance estimated by the aggressive (informed) trades. Return is calculated as the 
log changes of the first and last quotes of that day and it is reported in percentage points 
in the table. t- Statistic is in parentheses. 
2-year 5-year 10-year 
Panel A: TIB 
slope 10% lower than average -0.033% -0.001% -0.033% 
(-2.45) (-0.03) (-0.67) 
slope 15% lower than average -0.030% -0.004% -0.004% 
(-2.04) (-0.09) (-0.07) 
slope 20% lower than average -0.015% 0.013% 0.003% 
(-0.83) (0.27) (0.04) 
slope 25% lower than average -0.005% 0.025% -0.064% 
(-0.19) (0.40) (-0.50) 
slope 30% lower than average -0.002% -0.0250/0 0.048% 
(-0.06) (-0.31 ) (0.31) 
Panel B: TIBAI 
slope 10% lower than average -0.017% 0.021% 0.028% 
( -1.15) (0.65) (0.54) 
slope 15% lower than average -0.001% 0.033% 0.077% 
(-0.07) (0.87) (1.13) 
slope 20% lower than average 0.019% 0.058% 0.124% 
(1.01) (1.26) (1.60) 
slope 25% lower than average 0.058% 0.091% 0.007% 
(2.40) (1.49) (0.05) 
slope 30% lower than average 0.083% 0.101% 0.025% 
(2.53) (1.34) (0.16) 
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Table 29 
Profits from Trading Strategy Conditional on Lagged Trade Imbalance Based on 
the Method in Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) 
This table reports the average returns over the period from June I, 2005 to May 30, 2008 
for the 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year notes. TIB is trade imbalance estimated by all trades, 
while TIB _FA I is trade imbalance estimated by the aggressive (informed) trades. The 
returns are resulting from (i) the trading strategy that buys (sells) if the previous day's 
trade imbalance is positive (negative), or (ii) a trading strategy that buys (sells) if the 
trade imbalance is positive (negative) and large (more than one or two standard deviation 
from zero). If we buy (sell), we buy (sell) at the opening ask (bid) quote and sell (buy) at 
the closing bid (ask) quote. Return is the log changes of the first and last quotes of that 
day and it is in percentage points. t- Statistics are in parentheses. 
2-year 5-year lO-year 
Panel A: TIB 
TIB positive or negative -0.0177% -0.0149% -0.0264% 
(-4.06) (-1.45) (-1.71) 
TIB one standard deviation above or below zero .. 0.0161% -0.0132% -0.0383% 
(-1.98) (-0.79) ( -1.6) 
Till two standard deviation above or below zero -0.012% -0.0471% -0.029% 
(-0.44) ( -1.58) (-0.44) 
Panel B: TIBAI 
TIBAI positive or negative -0.0135% -0.0213% -0.0198% 
(-2.75) (-2.04) (-1.24) 
TIBA lone standard deviation above or below 
-0.0177% -0.0272% -0.0369% 
zero 
(-1.95) (-1.48) (-1.37) 
TIBA 1 two standard deviation above or below 
zero 
-0.02670/0 -0.009640/0 -0.0849% 
(-1.53) (-0.22) (-1.57) 
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Appendix I. 
Construction Spending: It is defined as the dollar value of new construction activity on 
residential, non-residential, and public projects. Construction spending has a direct 
influence on stocks, bonds and commodities because it is a part of the economy that is 
affected by interest rates, business cash flow and even federal fiscal policy. 
Factory Orders: Factory orders represent the dollar level of new orders for both durable 
and nondurable goods. The report can tell what to expect from the manufacturing sector, 
a major component of the economy and exert a tremendous impact on the financial 
market. 
Employment Situation: The employment situation is a set of labour market indicators 
based on two separate surveys in this one report. The employment situation is the 
fundamental monthly indicator of aggregate economic activity because it contains all 
major sectors of the economy. A healthy labour market benefits the stock market because 
it supports economic growth and corporate profits, while bond traders are likely to 
concern about the potential for inflationary pressures. 
International Trade: International trade is composed of merchandise (tangible goods) 
and services. It is available nationally by export, import and trade balance. Since trade 
balance is a valuable indicator of economic trends in the U.S. and abroad, trade figures 
can directly impact all financial markets, especially the foreign exchange market. 
Treasury Budget: It represents the account of the surplus or deficit of the federal 
government. The budget data have several direct and indirect impacts on the financial 
markets. The most apparent relationship is between the size of the budget deficit and the 
supply of Treasury securities. 
Retail Sales: Retail sales measure the total receipts at stores that sell durable and 
nondurable goods, in which consumer spending account for a large part. The situation in 
consumer spending usually the exert influence on stock and bond markets. 
Producer Price Index: It is the measure of the average price level for a fixed basket of 
capital and consumer goods received by producers. By understanding price pressures in 
the pipeline, investors can expect inflationary outcomes in coming months. 
Business Inventories: Business inventories are the dollar amount of inventories held by 
manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers. The stock market prefers healthy economic 
growth because that leads to higher corporate profits. The bond market is more 
favourable for moderate growth that won't generate inflationary pressures. 
Industrial Production: It is the index of industrial production available nationally by 
market and industry groupings. Industrial production is an important indicator of current 
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output for the economy and helps to define turning points in the business cycle. 
Consumer Price Index: The consumer price index is available nationally by expenditure 
category and by commodity and service group for all urban consumers (CPI-U) and wage 
earners (CPI-W), which has close relationship with inflation. Inflation basically tells how 
interest rates are set on everything from mortgage and auto loans to Treasury bills, notes 
and bonds. 
Housing Starts: A housing start is registered at the start of construction of a new 
building intended primarily as a residential building. Changes in the rate of housing starts 
express the demand for homes and the outlook for the construction industry. 
Leading Indicators: It is a composites index of ten economic indicators that should lead 
overall economic activity. By knowing leading indicators, investors will know what the 
economic background is for the various markets. 
GDP: GDP represents the total value of the country's production during the period and 
consists of the purchases of domestically-produced goods and services by individuals, 
businesses, foreigners and government entities. GDP components such as consumer 
spending, business and residential investment, and inflation indexes reflect the economy's 
condition, which can translate to investment chance and understanding in managing a 
portfolio. 
Personal Income and Outlays: It represents the income that households receive from all 
sources including wages and salaries, fringe benefits such as employer contributions of 
private pension plans, proprietors' income, income from rent, dividends and interest and 
transfer payments such as Social Security and unemployment compensation. To some 
extent, Personal Income and Outlays tells income and consumption situation. Increases 
in income and consumption will cause bond prices to fall. 
New Home Sales: New home sales measure the number of newly constructed homes 
with a committed sale during the month. Specifically, trends in the new home sales 
convey important implications for the stocks of home builders, mortgage lenders and 




Announcement Source Frequenc Units Release 
Construction Spending Census Monthly % 10:00 am 
Factory Orders Census Monthly % 10:00 am 
Employment Situation BLS Monthly % 08:30 am 
International Trade BEA and Census Monthly $ billion 08:30 am 
Treasury Budget FMS Monthly $ billion 02:00pm 
Retail Sales Census Monthly % 08:30 am 
Producer Price Index BLS Monthly % 08:30 am 
Business Inventories Census Monthly % 08:30 am 
Industrial Production FRD Monthly % 09:15 am 
Consumer Price Index BLS Monthly % 08:30 am 
Housing Starts Census and HUD Monthly Million 08:30 am 
Leading Indicators The Conference Monthly % 10:00 am 
Board 
Durable Goods Orders Census Monthly % 08:30 am 
GDP BEA Quarterly % 08:30 am 
Personal Income and BEA Monthly % 08:30 am 
Outlays 
New Home Sales Census and HUD Monthly Thousan 10:00 am 
Note: Census( U.S. Census Bureau), BLS(Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of 
Labor), BEA(Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce), FMS(Financial 
Management Service, U.S. Department of the Treasury, FRD( Federal Reserve of Board of 
Governors), HUD(U.S. Department of Housing &Urban Development) 
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